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Abstract

This thesis includes an introduction to and translation

of Roland Barthes's L'ancienne rh^toriaue.

Originally

delivered as a series of lectures, Barthes's ancient

rhetoric offers a chronological study of rhetoric from its

beginnings in ancient Greece through the nineteenth century.
Following the principles of Saussurean linguistics,

Barthes divides his work into two main sections, a
syntagmatic section and a paradigmatic section.

The first

deals with the origins of rhetoric as it was used in courts
of law to try property cases and introduces the reader to

the works of Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, etc.

It traces

the various turns of classical rhetoric through the Middle

Ages and into the modern era, with special attention to
pedagogical methods and trends.

The second introduces the technical workings of
rhetoric through taxonomic systems and more importantly
through an analysis of the inventio. dispositio and
elocutio.

Barthes concludes his essay with a lengthy

peroration in which he calls for a new history of rhetoric
based on linguistics, semiology, Marxism, etc.

At the end

of his peroration, he draws attention to the ideology of
m.ass culture which is inherent in the history of rhetoric up
to the present.
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From philosophY, rhetoric.
That is,
here, to make from a volume, approximately,
more or less, a flower, to extract a flower,

to mourit it, or rather to have it mount

itself, bring itself to light--an(3 turning
away, as if from itself, come round again,
such a flower engraves--learning to
cultivate, by means of a lapidary's

reckoning, patience . . .
Jacques Derrida
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INTRODUCTION

The Study of rhetoric has traditionally unearthed more

questions than it can answer and di£5covered more problems
than it can solve.

As Roland Barthes explains at the

beginning of his treatise on ancient rhetoric,^ he undertook
to compile a brief overview of what was known of rhetoric's

history in order to lecture systematically on the subject.
Putting together the best sources on ancient rhetoric,
Barthes applied what he drew from the history of rhetoric

and his earlier studies in sociology, linguistics, and
semiology to these general questions.
It is true, as Barthes points out in his introduction,
that no brief, systematic treatment of ancient rhetoric

existed at the time.

George A. Kennedy's Classical Rhetoric

and Its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to

Modern Times. the closest work to approach what Barthes was

seeking, appeared only in 1980, sixteen years after
Barthes's course in ancient rhetoric.

Although larger in

scope than what Barthes proposes here, Kennedy's work

fulfills Barthes's request for a "chronological and

systematic" treatment of ancient rhetoric.

But a comparison

of the two would reveal Barthes's distinguishing
characteristics.

For example, Kennedy's v/ork in no way

connects rhetoric with social issues of class and power as

such.

And, whereas Barthes relies heavily upon linguistics

Vll

and semiology, Kennedy's history of rhetoric makes no use of
any extra-disciplinary systems.

There are also more

ambitious examinations of ancient rhetoric and its

applications to teaching, e.g., Edward P.J. Corbett's
Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student, but Corbett's

compendious and tendentious work was not what Barthes had in
mind for his more concise and probing "aide-memoire."

(Besides, the first edition of Corbett's rhetoric appeared
in 1965, a year after Barthes's seminar).
There exists a basic difference between traditional

Anglo-American studies of language and literature and
continental theories.

English—speaking scholars have tended

to focus on the individual work and its place in the history
of literature, while continental scholars have tended to

devise systems for the study of language and literature in
general.

The rhetoric of Anglo—American writers, whether

"new" or "old," is most often dogmatically objective; their
"history" of rhetoric is concerned only with the

chronological facts.

Thus for Kennedy, it matters not at

all that rhetoric sprang up in Ancient Greece out of

pjfoperty disputes, or that rhetoric has been used through
the ages to enhance the authority of certain groups at the
expense of oppressed minorities.

It matters only that

rhetoric was used in the political arena, that rhetoric was

taught to certain young men down through the centuries. But
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for Barthes arid some of, his colleagues, these subjects are

of fundamental importarice.

No strangers to Marxism, they

are quick to pick up concerns over such issues as private
property, the oppression of certain classes, and the
situation of power among an elect group.

The ideology inherent in Barthes's "aide-memoire" and
in much of his other writing is clear.

It is a desire to

dislodge the comfortable assumptions of the petit

bourgeoisie, the Ways in which it turns its myths into
"uniyersal nature

.

Bafthes states in "Introduction: The

Semiological Adventure" (1974), that

what Semiology must attack is not only . . . the

petit-bourgeois good conscience, but the symbolic
and semantic system of our entire civilization; it
is not enough to seek to change contents, we must
above all aim at fissurina the meaning-system

itself: we must emerge from the Occidental
enclosure . . . (8)

The emphasis of classical rhetoric has traditionally
been on teaching and performing.

From, its earliest sources

in ancient Greece down to modern times, rhetoric has been
used to teach students to speak and write well.

rhetoric," such as that expounded by Group

The "new

, has been

employed almost exclusively as a means of literary study and
a system for literary analysis.

IX

The "new rhetoric," or what

Jonathan Culler calls "the structuralist revival of

rhetoric," has succeeded in utilizing figures--especiallY
synecdoche, metaphor and metdnymy--as a way to inform

reading and interpretation.^ Thus, as Culler states in
Structuralist Poetics, when the reader comes upon a given

figure, he or she can perform a series of systematic

operations which will lead him or her "from one meaning to
another—from the 'deviant' to the integrated . . .

labelling this transformation as appropriate to a particular
poetic mode" (179).

Further on, he writes that

the repertoire of rhetorical figures serves as a
set of instructions which readers can apply when

they encounter a problem in the text, though in
some cases it is not so much the operations
themselves that are important as the reassurance
that rhetorical categories offer the reader:
reassurance that what seems odd is in fact

perfectly acceptable since it is figurative
expression of some kind and therefore capable of
being understood. (181)

What Barthes does initially in his "aide-memoire" is to
disregard this new rhetoric, saying that "it does not yet
exist," and decide that the questions posed by rhetoric are
best answered by approaches introduced from the study of

linguistics and semioiogy; one of his more important
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"moves," in order to expose the underlying importance and

sociological significance of ancient rhetoric in Barthes's

work, is this assertion which he purports to address in his
essay.

Despite his avov;ed distance from new rhetoric,

Barthes cites the innovative work of PcreIman and Obrechts-

Tyteca, but more revealingly, his essay also shares many
common concerns with Group

's General Rhetoric. which came

out simultaneously with Barthes's publication of his "aide-

Indeed, Group JU , in its introduction to the General
Rhetoric. states that "rhetoric appears not only as a

science of the future but also as a timely science within

the scope of structuralism, new criticism and semiology"
(1).

In fact. Group jm's General Rhetoric is based upon

semiological analyses of metaboles (changes in any aspect of

language), a concept obviously called for by Barthes in his
earlier work and reaffirmed in the peroration of his essay

on ancient rhetoric.

This project was perhaps influenced by

Barthes and the work of the Tel Ouel group, especially when

it comes to the study of narrative structures, something
Barthes does in his "Introduction to the Structural .Analysis
of Narratives" (1966).

(Dates given for Barthes's work

refer to the original French texts.)

In addition the

General Rhetoric asserts that "the rhetorical function has

the effect of reifying language (21), i.e., it makes
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language an object of study and classification.
Annette Lavers ill Roland Barihes: Structuralism and

After. also speculates that Barthes dissociates himself from
the new rhetoric because of its reliance on binarism and

because he considers binary opposition as representing a

rather primitive logic and "a historical process of
reification" (126)

But in defense of binarism, Barthes

writes in Elements of Semiology (1965):

. . . the opposition is still in the a11-6r
nothina category.

We again find the principle of

difference which is the foundation of opposition:

it is this principle which must inspire ti^e
analysis of the associated sphere; for to deal
with the opposition can only mean to observe the

relations of similarity or difference which may
exist between the terms of the opposition. (74)

Saussurean linguistics, which has had a most profound
influence on the structuralists, is based on this notion of
difference; for example, the wdrds "gut" and "cut" are

distinguished from each other solely by the difference
between the minimal features of the voiced and unvoiced

consonants /g/ and /c/.

And so it is precisely this

semiological and linguistic model—-the structuralist
enterprise—which Barthes employs in his essay.
But Maria Ruegg in her article "Metaphor and Metonymy:

xii

The Logic of Structuralist Rhetoric," argues convincinglY
that "structuralists, who pretend to make an abrupt break
with pre-scientific thought," are curiously drawn to
classical rhetoric.

In their attempt to take up Saussure's

arguments, such structuralists as Roman Jakobson and Jacques
Lacan, and by extension, Barthes himself, force all of

language into two poles (metonymy/metaphor: Jakobson and

Lacan, syntagmatic/paradigmatic: Barthes), thereby reducing
"complex givens to the terms of simple binary

opposition . . ." and ignoring "logical inconsistencies
within the binary oppositions themselves" (141-57).

Had she

known Barthes's "aide-mdmoire," she could have argued more

strongly for the structuralist's fascination with classical
rhetoric.

Metaphor and metonymy, terms which themselves come from
rhetoric, are one such binary opposition, taken up by

Jakobson in his work on poetics and by Lacan in his v;ork on

psychoanalysis.

Lanaue (any individual's system of

language) and parole (the actual events of speech) ,
constitute the original Saussurean opposition.

The

syntagmatic and paradigmatic are a third binary opposition,
seized upon by structural linguistics and in turn by
Barthes.

'■

Now the syntagmatic axis of language, which
characterizes "the ordered arrangement of phonemes,

XI11

inorpKeittes ," words or parts of discourse, ;;repre&^

a ;

■

horizontal movement which relates it to the diachronic

aspect of languagei ' thht which corisiderS: phenomena as they
occur or deve1op through time

also a horizontal movement.

And the paradigmatic axis of language, "the listing of all

the phonemes," morphemes, words, figures and other "isolated
elements" from which individual units are chosen> represents

a vertical movement which relates it to the synchronic

aspect of language, or the study of events of a particular
time or era without consideration of historical data (Pei
and Gaynor > 159 and 211).

And yet, as Derek Attridge stresses in Peculiar
Language. Saussure, from whom Barthes borrov;s his structure
based on binary oppositions, did not in fact oppose

diachrony to synchrony, but merely separated the tvjo in
order to develop a methodological approach to language based
on parole.

Subsequent followers of Saussure—notably Emile

Benveniste and Roman Jakobson—mistakenly polarized the two ,

terms and linked lanaue with diachrony, and also placed the ;

paradigmatic on the same (vertical) axis as synchrony and

the syntagmatic on the same (horizontal) axis as diachrony
(94-95).

This move reifies an opposition that is not really

an opposition, but nonetheless has had widespread effects on
structuralism.

Whatever the case may be, these

polarizations have enjoyed much popular appeal, probably due
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to the graphic clarity and strategic usefulness of such

binary oppositiohstQ argue other:matters in the human
sciences-—Lacan in psychoanarysisV Levi-^Strauss in

anthropology, Jakobson in linguistics.
Barthes's essay on rhetoric—although it takes as its

very structure this bipolarizati on—seems to account for the
complexities of such distinctions.

For example, Barthes

makes a "stop" at Gorgias, whose codification of prose gives
rhetoric a paradigmatic aspect.

And Barthes actually

provides us with a paradigmatic diagram which designates the
differences between the Platonic "good rhetoric" (that of
dialectic) and "bad rhetoric" (that of the Sophists) (A.3.3.

of text).

Likewise, under the general paradigmatic section

(B,0.4. of text), Barthes connects the syntagmatic of
discourse with the paradigmatic by making use of a tree-like

metaphor, one which evolves from his paradigmatic diagram.

At this point he abandons a strict binary opposition in
order to introduce the most important steps in the

rhetorical process: inventio. dispositio. elocutio. % In
Beautiful Theories. Elizabeth Bruss writes. "it is in the

Sade essay that he begins to use tree diagrams, rather than

compiling syntagms and paradigms" (438).

Quite properly,

Bruss sees the tree diagram as a compromise with true
binarism.

But what she has left out is Barthes's

transitional metaphor between the binary diagram and the
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i tree diagram.

(See also S/Z. 129).

In speaking ■ of Saussure (B/3 i 4^ of text)', Barthes asks

i

what can be made "of the stable combinations of words, of

: the fixed syntngfts which partake Of language^

I structure and combination at the same time?"

speech, of

Clearly, ;

rather than seeing the binary opposition between diachrony

i and synchrony as simple and straightforward, Barthes views
: structural linguistics as adding complexity to the system of
language. : As he writes in Criticism and Truth (1966):
i

The work of linguistics is not to reduce the

ambiguities of language, but to comprehend them
and, so to speak, institute them . . . the

■

/

symbolic language to which literary works belong
is bv its very structure a plural language whose
code is constructed in such a way that every

j

utterance (every work) engendered by it has
multiple meanings. (70-71 )

in all, 1 believe that Barthes's work on classical rhetoric

1 succeeds in delineating the complexities of language in
general and ancient rhetoric especially, even though the
historicist is likely to find his methods merely

distracting.

But this may be Barthes's point exactly

to

drive the historicist-academicians off, to destablize the
academicians' "rhetoric," their "language," their "system .

that historical and positivistic bias, without departing
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from classical texts.

Dividing his essay on rhetoric as he does, then, into
the diachronic Voyage (a descent through time) and the

synchronic Network (an exploration of the individual parts
of discourse), Barthes gives us an accessible account of the

important turns of classical rhetoric and its influence on
society.

Section A, the Voyage, takes us on a journey

through history, with stops or "day trips" as he calls them,
at the most salient points in rhetoric's past, from its

origin in property disputes, through Gorgias and Plato, to
Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian, and on to the "death" of
rhetoric.

Section B, the Network, examines the divisions of
classification of the parts of discourse by the metaphor of

a "huge creeper which descends level by level, now dividing
a generic element, now reuniting scattered parts" (B.C.4. of
text).

Barthes, here, passes rhetoric through machines,

systems and grids, picking up content to fill the form of
Section A (content being associated with the paradigmatic

and form with the syntagmatic).

In this section, we again

encounter names from the past, but now in more detail and
substance.

We are dealing in this section with what

Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, etc., actually did with
rhetoric.

A note on Aristotle: the Aristotle in Barthes's essay
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is likely to seem unfainiliar to American readers; he is not

the elitist philosopher taught in American universities,
most notably among the University of Ghicagd Neo-

Aristotelians, who helped make their Aristotle authoritative
for their kind of literary criticism, as well as their

peculiarly American tradition of "Ideas and Methods

Instead, Barthes's Aristotle becomes a skillful trader in
the goods of mass culture',

^arthes's entire conception of

Aristotle hinges on the notion of verisimilitude, or that

which appears to be true.

For Barthes's Aristotle, it is

important merely to convince an audience that something is
likely or probable—it doesn't matter whether it is factual
or even possible.

This places him well beyond the Platonic

ideal of Truth arrived at through dialectic and almost into

the Sophist camp.

Above all, Barthes's Aristotle would have

rhetoric appeal to the greatest number.

It is a rhetoric of

the democracy, where popular appeal reigns supreme.

Although until recently critics and scholars have paid
little attention to Barthes's treatise on ancient rhetoric,
Barthes interest in rhetoric in general has a long and

steady history.

As early as Writing Degree Zero (1953),

Barthes worries out the problems of how v/riters deal with
their literary and rhetorical inheritance and how many

modern writers attempt to achieve a "colorless" writing, a
kind of writing (always doomed to fail) that tries to
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abandon its rbetorical past.

And in Image/Music/Text. Barthes also extehds his

knowledge of rhetoric to discourse analysis./ (See
"Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives.")

Again in another article, "The Reality Effect" (1968),
Barthes writes that

Western culture, in one of its major currents, has

certainly not left description without a meaning,
but has in fact assigned to it an end perfectly
well recognized by the institution of literature.

The current is rhetoric, and the end is "beauty":
description has long had an aesthetic function.
(12)

The "aide-memoire," falling, as it does, squarely in
Barthes's "structuralist phase," bears a close resemblance

with other works of the same period.

Many of Barthes's

commentators have admitted that there are problems in

classifying his works into discrete categories, and Bruss
notes that the Barthes the English-speakd ng world knows has
much to do with the order in which his works were translated
(366).

But his interest in rhetoric and the structural

approach it invites seem constant and long-lived.
//■■; • ■'

writes;

As Lavers
/

Following Saussure's founding gesture as it does,
it is appropriate that the headings in Elements
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rOf Sem1o1oQV (1964) 1 mos11y come from his famous
dichotomies: Language and Speech, Signifier and

Signified, Syhtagm and System (or Paradigm).

The

dichotomy between Synchrony and Diachrony is found
in the chapter on language and speech in
connection with the notion of linguistic value and
also in the conclusion, in connection with
methodological hints about the formation of a

corpus for research.

Each of these sections first

establishes why some particular linguistic
concepts and operations are suitable for extension
to semiology . . . (135-36)
In S/Z (1970) Barthes tells us that his five codes fall

into a network, "a kind of topos through which the entire
text passes (or rather, in passing, becomes text)" (20).

And later in the same work, we note that the rhetorical code
takes over as the organizing element, that it pushes the

sentence through a transformation into text by way of a tree
with "forks," "branches" and "joints" (128-29), echoing
through metaphor the tree diagrams developed a few years

earlier as an outgrowth of his work in the "aide-memoire."
Similarly in Sade/Fourier/Lovola (1971). Barthes treats the
"network" as a topic or grill.
a form pre-existent to any invention . . . a

tablature of cases through which the subject to be
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treated (the guaestio) is guided . . . .

Thus the

topic contains all the wonders of an arsenal of
latent powers. (58)

As should be evident, the "aide-memoire" comes between
Barthes's studies in sociology and his fully formulated work
in semiology.

Here, ancient rhetoric is examined by a

"structuralist" whose tools are supplied by linguistics and

sociology, leading to his own work in semiology.

Throughout

much of his work, then, and over a long period of time,
Barthes applies rhetorical models and semiological methods
to the subject at hand.

Lavers writes:

In the discourses of society, Barthes identifies
figures which he lists at the end as in a treatise
of rhetoric.

This gives rise to the question, as

in the case of Marxism, why rhetoric, which
clearly corresponds to Barthes's spontaneous way

of looking at things is not presented as an

explicit model in "Myth Today."

Actually the two

problems partly overlap: Marxism and its Hegelian
sources (for instance. The Phenomenology of Mind,
frequently used by Lacan) have often of late been

viewed as systems of figures.

All of Barthes's

spontaneous objects of study, themes in Michelet,

myths in Mythologies. functions and patterns in On
Racine. and even the signifieds of the various

XXI

fragments which make up so many of his works, are
all figures in the wider sense.

His use of

figures as a category is therefore overdetermined.

'■(1231 f: . ;■ . ■ ■ ■;

'■/.If; :: ■ '

Another of Barthes's abiding interests is the

connection between language and class.

Originally a

sociologist, and continuously interested in Marx throughout
his intellectual voyage, Barthes was keenly aware that how

one speaks largely determines who one is.

Although this may

be a universal of language, or at least it holds in Western

cultures, Barthes notes that it was and is especially true

in France.

From this awareness it is but a small step to an

interest in the origins, of language and class.

Language,

when it is used publicly begins to function rhetorically.
A.lthough Barthes shifted his theoretical positions and
methods frequently and often abruptly, the major part of his
work shows a sharp and persistent interest in the social

institution of language—and that social institution is
rhetoric.

Elsewhere in his writings, Barthes also extends

the notion of language as class to the priesthood of writers

and critics, those v;ho establish power through language and
control who may use it and how it is to be used—those

guardians of present-day language.

In his much publicized

reply to the critic Raymond Picard, Criticism and Truth.
Barthes views the language strictures of traditional
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criticism as those of a special class. just as in the

present essay he claims that all Special language, i.e. ,
rhetoric, stems from class needs.

"French 'clarity,'" he

writes, "is a language whose origin is political" (47).

And

again, "it [critical language] is universally appropriated
by the class of property owners" (49).

Above all, "language

is never innocent."

Recognizing as we do that not every use of language is
rhetorical, we note that what is constant in almost all of
Barthes's writing on language is that language is an object
in itself and not an instrument.

Language by itself need

not always be studied or used as a means to an end, it does
not always or necessarily expose or indicate external

reality (referents); but it is always for liim and, so he
claims, for all writers, a problem, an intensely complex

object of study and experimentation (Criticism and Truth.
64).

Never is this more evident than in Barthes's own

writing.

Barthes's language is at once erudite and antiintellectual.

He is the master of neologisms and archaisms,

and he has a special fondness for words with multiple
meanings.

long suit.

Clarity, as stated previously, is not Barthes's

He favors a language "full of uncertainties."

Again in Criticism and Truth. he writes
Still today they [the old critics] fight with
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ridiculous passioii for tHeif /'Fre^^^
oracular chronicles; fuim

against foreign

invasions, death sentences on certain supposedly ,
unwanted words.
i

We must endlessiyelean, Scraps

off, forbid, eliminate, preserve."

This: is precisely; wh

(47)

to do in his own

^

writing.

Compared with English, French syntax is somewhat loose,
and Barthes's syntax is loose even by French standards.

Throughout the body of the "aide-mdmoire," he keeps fairly
close to standard French, but in his peroration, he
unleashes his language, so that it tends to become

rhapsodic.

This rhapsodic prose, one senses, is v/hat :

Barthes wishes to write all along, but under the constraints
of a scholarly study, he is unable to break loose.

This is

typical for much of Barthes's writing; he is able to sneak

his exotic words into fairly straight discourse when .

necessary, but there is often this release, this plunge into
the delight of writing for its own sake.
Elizabeth Bruss writes in Beautiful Theories;

In Barthes's later writing, with what Culler calls

its "preference for loose and evasive appositional
syntax," the emphasis falls more heavily on the

individual word and especially on its shimmering
capacity to mean many different and inconsistent
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,

things at once, once syntax no longer constrains

it to a single value.

Moreover Barthes always

played with and against the standards of

linguistic purity as determined by the French
Academy (an institutional commitment to the

national tongue that neither England nor America :
can match), and if the aura of each separate word
becomes greater, so too must the delicate

interplay between the common and the arcane, the
polite word and the vulgarism. (372)

The reference here is to Jonathan Culler's "The Ever-Moving
Finger," (934), Times Literary Supplement no.3782, (90
August 1974).

All of this makes translating Barthes's work a

difficult and at times impossible task.

As Bruss notes:

with a writer as supple as Barthes and one as
intoxicated by enantiosemes (words with the same

form, but contradictbry meanings) and-amphibology
(phrases where the grammar allows two or more

distinct readings) as lie gradually became,
translation will always present problems. (371)

Barthes's punctuation is also strangely idiosyncratic, so
that, at times, it is impossible to track dovm the
antecedent of a particular pronoun.

Lavers writes of

Barthes's punctuation that it is always a guide to something
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iinportant, soitietimes being "weirdly casual" in the :face of a
significant matter (57-58).

Beyond all this, there are the overwhelming problems^ ^^o
modern translation in general.

Recent, work in trans.1 ation

has emphasized that an enterprise that sets out to give a
"faithful translation" is doomed to failure.

By now it is

conventional wisdom that is not enough to hold close to the

text.

The real goal of translation is not to reduce the

author's ideas or to replace one signifier with another, :

presumably equal signifier.

The translator must realize

that a skilled "reading" is as close as he or she can come
to a fair rendition of the original.

As Barbara Johnson points out in her essay, "Taking

Fidelity Philosophically," "faithfulness to the text has r
meant faithfulness to the semantic tenor with as little

interf©rsncG as possible for th© constraints of th© v©hicl©.

Translation, in oth©r words, has always been the translation
of meaning" (145).

But the deconstructionists have made

evident th© impossibility of this traditional approach to

translation.

With words that ar© d©lib©rat©ly as polysemic

as possibl© and n©w conc©pts of t©xtuality, on© has th©
choic© of inv©nting a n©w and similar m©aning or retaining
the original language (144-46).

In my own trans1ation, I have attempted to give a close
and sensitive reading of Barthes's work, while at the same
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time preserving as much, of the indeterminacy as possible.
This has hot, I realize, always been successful.

At times I

have opted for a decisive meaning, when to do otherwise
would have produced sheer nonsense.

I have, above all,

tried to let Barthes's own language and style come through.
As Walter Benjamin writes in "The Task of the
Translator,"

a real translation is ttansparent; it does not
block its light, but allows the pure language, as
though reinforced by its own medium, to shine upon

the original all the more fully.

This may be

a.chieyed, above all, by a literal rendering of the
syntax which proves words rather than sentences to
be the primary element of the translator.

(79)

If the syntax in my translation sometimes seems awkward, it
is largely for this reason.

Finally, where Barthes's

vocabulary is especially difficult, I have provided
translator's notes to clarify the language as much as

possible.
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Ancient Rhetoric

A Handbook^

:

■ ::

By Roland Barthes

The following is a transcription of a seminar given at

the ficole Pratique des Hautes fitudes in 1964-1965.

At the

beginning--Or the horizon—-of this seminar ,i as always / there
was the modern text, that is: the text which does not vet

exist.

One way to approach this new text is to know from

the outset the source from which and the background against
which it tries to understand itself, and then to cbmpare the

new semiotic of writing with the ancient practice of

literary language which has been called Rhetoric down

through the centuries.

Hence the idea for a seminar on

ancient Rhetoric: ancient does not mean that there is a new

Rhetoric today; rather Ancient Rhetoric is set against the
new one which perhaps has not yet been achieved: the world
is incredibly full of ancient Rhetoric.

I would never have agreed to publish these working
notes if a manual, a notebook of some sort, v;hich presented

a chronological and systematic overview of that ancient and :
classical Rhetoric had already existed.

Unfortunately, to

my knowledge, there is nothing of the sort (at least not in

French).

I have therefore been obliged to put together this

knowledge myself, and it is the result of t^^^

personal

^

introduction (proPedeutic) which is presented here: here is

the handbook that I would have v/ished to find complete at

the time I began to ask myself about the death of Rhetoric.
Nothing more, then, than an elementary system of

information, the preliminary listing of a certain number of
terms and classifications—which is not to imply that in the

course of this work I was not frequently struck with
excitement and admiration by the force and subtlety of that

ancient rhetorical system, the modernity of some of its
propositions. .. .

Unfortunately, (for practical reasons) I am no longer
able to authenticate the references for this text of

knowledge: I have had to draft this manual in part from
memory.

My excuse is that these are matters of common

knowledge: Rhetoric is poorly known, yet to know it does not

require one to be erudite; therefore everyone wi11 be able
to find easily the bibliographical references which are

missing here.

What is assembled {at times, perhaps on its

own, in the form of involuntary citations) proceeds

essentially from: (1) treatises on the rhetoric of antiquity
and classicism, (2) scholarly introductions to the collected
works of Guillaume Bud^, (3) two fundamental books, one by

Curtius and the other by Baldwin, (4) some specialized

articles, notably tfe
.some Customary sources^^^ ^S

with the Middle Ages, (5)
Morier's dictionary of

Rhetoric, F. Brunot's history of the French language, and a
book by R. Bray on the development of classical doctrine in
France, and (6) some related readihgs, themselves

;fragmeritary an(i cohtingerit iKojeve:,'Jaeger
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'0;i. THE RHETORIGAL PRACTICE
The rhetoric which will be examined here is that meta

language (whose language-object was "discourse") which

ptevai

in the western wdrid from the fifth centuty; (B.G1}

until the nineteenth century.

We will not be cohcerned with

more remote experiences (india, i;siam),^ ^:^^^^^^^^^^

are the

proper concern of the Orient, and of the western material we

will restrict ourselves to Athens, Rome, and France.

This

meta-language (discourse on discourse) allowed for various

practices in "Rhetoric" which were present simultaneously or
successively according to the period:
1•

A technique, that is, an "art" in the classical

sense of the word: the art of persuasion, a set of rules and

formulas which, when put into operation, allows the audience
of a discourse (and much later, the reader of a work) to be

convinced, even if he must be persuaded of something which
is "false."

/ . 2.

An academic discipline:: the art of rhetnri r, at

first transmitted by interpersonal means (a rhetor and his

disciples, iiis clients), rapldlY worked its way into those
institutions of learning; in the schools it has formed the

core of what one would; toddy call the second stage of

secondary and advanced education; it has transformed itself
into examination material (exercises, lessons, tests)v
3.

A science. or in any case, a proto-science; that

is; (a) an autonomous field of Study, delimiting certain
homogeneous phenomena, in order to uhderstand the "effects"
of language, (b) a classification of these phenomena (whose
best-known mark is the list'of rhetorical."figures"), (c) an.

"Operation" in the Hjelmslevian sense, in other words, a

meta-language, the set of treatises on rhetoric, the
subject—or signified—-of which is a language-object
(argumentative language and "figurative" language).
4.

An ethic: as a system of "rules," rhetoric is

permeated with the ambiguity of the word: it is at one and
the same time a manual of formulas, driven by a practical

finality, and a Code, a body of moral prescriptions which
function to monitor (that is, to permit and restrain) the
"deviance" of emotional language,

5.

A social Practice: Rhetoric is that privileged

technique (since one must pay to acquire it) which allows

the ruling classes to assure themselves of fhe propriety of
their speech.

Language being a privilege or a power, they

have proclaimed selective rules of access to that power by

,4

making it into a pseudo-science, ,eipsed to "those who do not
know how to speak," dependent upon a costly initiation: born

2,500 years ago of property disputes, rhetoric wore out and
died when the ''rhetoricai:" clasa,d

when tke bourgeois ;

culture was first established.

ft' a iiidic practice; AiL these practices constitute a

powerful (today one would say ''repressiye'') .institutional:
system; it Was inevitabl^^^^

it should Spread: to include a

mock rhetoric, a ''bieok'' rhetoric (accusations, insults,
ironies); play, parody, erotic or obscene allusions,

college jokes, all those :sehoolboy pranks (which

^

incidentaliy remain to be e^PiOred and classified according
to cultural codes).

, 0.2. THE EMPIRE OF RHETORIC-^ i :
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All these practices attest to the breadth Of the

achievement of rhetoric—an achievement which nevertheless

has not yet given rise to any important synthesis or

:

historical interpretation. Perhaps it is because rhetoric

Cbeyond the taboo which weighs.upon language), a veritable

: e^ipi^s / uaster and more tenacious than any political einOire,
by its dimensions, by its endurance, frustrates,; the very y .
limits of science and historical reflection, to the point of

implicating history itseif at least as we are accustomed to
imagine and manage it, and compellihg us to invent what
otherwise might be called a monumental history.

The

scientific contempt attached to rhetoric would partake then,

of that general refusal to recognize multiplicity,
pverdetermination.

Let one dream, nevertheless, that

rhetoric—whatever might be the internal variations of the

system—has reigned in the west for two and a half millenia,
from Gorgias to Napoleon III; let one dream of all that

which, immutable, impassible, and almost immortal, it has
seen born, pass and disappear, without itself moving or

altering: the Athenian democracy, the Egyptian dynasties,
the Roman Republic, the Roman Empire, the great invasions,
the feudal system, the Renaissance, the monarchy, the

Revolution; it has withstood regimes, religions,
civilizations; moribund since the Renaissance, it takes
three centuries to die, and it is still not absolutely dead.

Rhetoric gives rise to what must indeed be called a super-

civilization: the historical and geographic Occident: it was

the only system (along with grammar, born after it) that

permitted our society to recognize language and its
supremacy (kurosis. as Gorgias puts it), which was also a
form of social superiority; the classification system it

imposed is the only truly common feature of successive and
varying historical groupings, as if an ideology of form
existed beyond ideologies of content and the determinacy of

history, as if—a principle anticipated by Durkheim and
Mauss and confirmed by Levi—Strauss

a taxonomic—identity

existed for each society, a socio-logic that makes it
possible to define another history, another social order,
without destroying those which are recognized at other
levels.

0.3. THE VOYAGE TdSID THE NETWORK

This vast territory will here be explored (in the loose
and casual sense of the term) in two directions: a

diachronic direction and a systematic direction.

We cannot

reconstruct a history of rhetoric with absolute certainty;
we will have to content ourselves with isolating a few

significant moments; we will tour two thousand years of
rhetoric, stopping off at some points of interest which will
be like "day trips" (these "day trips" may be a bit uneven
in duration).

In this extended diachrony, there will be

seven stages in all, seven "day trips," whose value will be
essentially didactic.

Then we will reassemble the

classifications of the rhetors in order to form a unique
network, a sort of artifact allowing us to imagine the art

of rhetoric as a finely adjusted machine, a system of

operations, a "program" intended to produce discourse.

A.

THE VOYAGE

A.1.

THE BIRTH OF RHETORIC

A.1.1.

Rhetoric and property.

Rhetoric (as meta-language) was born of property
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disputes.

Around 485 B.C., two Sicilian tyrants, Gelon and ,

Hieron, conducted deportations, pdpulation transfers and

exprppriations, in order to populate Syracuse and to
distribute mercenaries.

When they were overthrown by a

popular revolt and the people wished to return to the ante
QUO. there were innumerable law suits, because property

rights had been obscured.

These suits were of a new type:

they mobilized popular grand juries, and in order to
convince them, the speaker now had to be "eloquent."

This

eloquence/ partaking at the same time of democracy and
demagoguery, the judicial and the political (later called
the deliberativeV. caught on raoidlv as a subject to be

taught.

The first professors of the new discipline were

Empedocles of Agrigento, Corax, his student from Syracuse
(the first to pay for his lessons), and Tisias.

This

teaching spread just as quickly in Athens (after the Median
wars), owning to disputes by merchants who pleaded jointly
in Syracuse and in Athens: rhetoric is already, in part,
Athenian by the middle of the fifth century B.C.

A.1.2.

A great svntaamatic.

What is proto-rhetoric, this Coraxian rhetoric?

A

rhetoric of the syntagm, of discourse, and not of tricks and
figures.

Corax already sets forth the five major parts of

the oratio. which over the centuries have formed the

"blueprint" of oratory discourse: (1) the exordium, (2) the

.^
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narration or action (an account of the facts), (3) the

argument or proof, (4) the digression, (5) the epilogue.

It

is easy to verify that in the shift from judicial discourse

to the scholarly dissertation, the blueprint has retained
its principal orgahization: ah introduction, a demonstrative

body, a conclusion.

That first rhetoric is, in effCcb, a

great syntagmatic.

A.1.3.

^

Deceptive speech.

It is tantalizing to note that the art Of speech is

originally bound up with property claims, as if language,
insofar as it is an object of transformation, the rules
governing a practice, were determined not to proceed from
subtle, ideological mediation (as had occurred with so many

art forms), but from the most naked social interaction,
confirmed in its fundamental brutality, that of the

possession of land: we began to reflect upon language as a

way of defending our own goods.

It is that spirit of social

conflict that gave birth to the first theoretical sketch of
deceptive speech (different from fictive speech, the speech

of poets: Poetry was the only literature at the time, prose
did not attain that status until much later).

A.2.

GORGIAS, OR PROSE AS LITERATURE

Gorgias of Leontium (today's Lentini, to the north of

Syracuse) came to Athens in 427; he had been Thucydides'

master and is Socrates' Sophist dnterldeutpr in:the Gornia?^.
The codification of pro.qp

Gorgias' chief interest for lis is that he brought prose
under the ;rhetoricai; code;, certifying it as learned

discourse, an aesthetic object, "sovereign language,"
ancestor of ''liters-turev"

How? The fhherai eiogies

(threnodies), composed at first in verse> passed into prose
and were entrusted to men of state; they were, if not

actually written (in the current sense of the wbrdj, at
least learned in a certain fixed manner.

Thus was born a

third genre :(after the judicial and the deliberative), the
epideietic: this iS the advent of ornamehtai prose, of
prose-spectacle.

In the.transition from verse to prose, the

meter arid music were lost.

Gorgias seeks to replace these

with a code more appropriate;t

(although borrbwed ?

from poetry): words of like consonance, symmetry of phrases,
reinforcement of antitheses by assonance, metaphor,
alliteration. '

A.2.2.

• '

'

The advent of elocutio.

Why make a stop at Gorgias along our voyage?

There are

roughly, in the complete art of rhetoric (that of

Quintilian, for example), two poles: the order of the parts
of discourse, the taxis or dispositio: and a paradigmatic
pole: the figures of rhetoric, the lexis or elocutio.

10

We

have seen that Corax launched a purely syntagmatic rhetoric.

Gorgias, in demanding that dne work the 'Vfigures /'V gives it

a paradigmatic aspect: it opens prose to rhetoric and
rhetoric to sylistics.

A.3.

PLATO

Plata's dia:iogues which deal directly with -rhetoric . ■
are: the Goraias and the Phaedrus.

ArS.l.

The two rhetorics.

.

r '

v-.



Plato treats of two rhetorics, one evil and the, other

good.

I. The rhetoric of fact is constituted by the :

lOQoaraphv. an activity which consists of writing any
discourse (it is not only a matter of judicial rhetoric; the

totality of the notion is important); its object is
verisimilitude, illusion; this is the rhetoric of the

i

rhetors, of the schools, of Gorgias, of the Sophists.

II.

The rhetoric of the right is the true rhetoric; ; ,

philosophical rhetoric or dialectic.

Its object is truth;

Plato calls it a psvchoaogv (the training of the soul

through speech). :The opposition of good and evil rhetoric,
Platonic and sophistic rhetoric, forms part of a very large

paradigm: on the one hand, flattery, servile activity, the

perversion of truth; on the other, the rejection of all
complacency or coarseness; on the one hand, controls and

routines, on the other hand, art: the activities of pleasure
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are a contemptible counterfeit Of the arts of the Good:

rhetoric is the counterfeit of justice, sophistry of

legislation, quackery of medicine, cosmetology of physical

fitness; rhetoric (that of the logdgraphers, the rhetors,
the sophists) is therefore not ah art.

A.3.2.

Eroticized rhetoric.

True rhetoric is a psychogogy; it demands a total

knowledge, impartial, common (this will become a topos with

Cicero and Quintilian, but the notion will be insipid: one
demands of the orator a good "general education").

The

object of this "synoptic" knowledge is the correspondence or
interaction between species of souls and the types of

discourse.

Platonic rhetoric renounces writing and turns

instead to interpersonal conversation. the adhominatio: the
fundamental mode of discourse is the dialogue between master
and pupil, united by inspired love.

To think in common.

this might be the motto of the dialectic.

Rhetoric is a

dialogue of love.

A.3.3

The division, the mark.

The dialecticians (those who live that eroticized

rhetoric) conduct two interdependent processes: one part, a
gathering/rising movement toward an unconditional term

(Socrates, reproving Lysias in the Phaedrus. defines love in

its totality, its unity); the other part, a descending

12.

movement, a division of the unity according to its natural
clefts, according to species, until reaching the indivisible
unit.

This "descent" proceeds by a climbing motion: with

each stop, each step, one encounters the two terms; it is,,
necessary to choose one over the other in order to increase
the descent and accede to a new binary split, from whence

one sets out afresh; such is the progressive definition of
the sophist:

G2\ME HUNTING

Land

Wi Id

Tame

(man).

by persuasion

by force

in private

in public'
with gifts ,'
,fOr
subsistence:
Flatterers

-ith^^gr^t
for money:

The Sophists

this segmented rhetoric—which sets itself apart from the
syllogistic rhetoric of Aristotle—closely resembles a

digital computer program: each choice determines the
alternative that follows; moreover according to the

paradigmatic structure of language, each binary segment
consists of a marked term and an unmarked term: here the

marked term raises the alternative play.
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But how does the

mark occur in the first place?

Where does it come from?

And here one rediscovers the eroticized rhetoric of Plato: .

within the Pratonic dialogue, the mark is generated by a
concession of the respondent (the pupil).

Plato's rhetoric

implies two interlocutors, one of whom admits defeat: that
is the necessary condition for mpyement.

Thus all these,

particles of agreement which we encounter in Plato's
dialogues, and which often make us smile at their silliness
and their obvious triviality (when they do not bore us), are
really structural "marks," rhetorical acts.

A.4.

ARISTOTELIAN RHETORIC

A.4.1.

Rhetoric and Poetics.

,

Isn't all rhetoric (if we exclude Plato) Aristotelian?

Yes, no doubt: all of the didactic elements which feed the
classical handbooks come from Aristotle.

Nevertheless, a

system does not define itself by its elements alone, but

also, and above all, by the opposition in which it finds
itself caught.

Aristotle wrote two treatises on discourse,

and the two are distinct: the Techne Rhetorike deals with

the art of everyday communication, with public discourse;
the Techne Poietike deals with the art of the inspired

imagination.

In the first case, it is important to control

the progression of the discourse from idea to idea; in the
second case, the flow of the work from image to image.

For

Aristotle, these are two independent thought processes, two

aUtohomous

is the oppbsitipri of these two v

SYStems, the rhetorical and the poetic, which in fact
defines Aristdteh

.

All authors whp acknowledge

this opposition can be placed in Aristotelian rhetoric; this
will cease when the opposition is neutralized, when Rhetoric

and Poetics merge, when rhetoric becdmes a poetic
techne '(a creative enterprise): this occurs during the

reigh of Augustus (with Ovid, Horace) and a bit later

(PlUtarcii, Tacitus)--aithaugh Quinti1ian sti11 practieps
%ristdtelian rhetoric

fueIdri bf Rhetoric and Toetids

is sanctioned by the vocabulary of the Middle Ages, a period
when the poetic arts are the rhetorical arts, when the great

rhetoricians are poets.

This fusion is paramount because it

is of the same origin as the idea of literature:

Aristotelian rhetoric places its emphasis on reasoning; the
elocutio (or the division of figures) is not even a part of

it (it has low priority with Aristotle).

Afterwards the

contrary is the case: rhetoric concerns itself with

problems; not with "evidence," but with composition and

style: literature (the act of writing in its fullest scope)
defines itself by the well-written.

We must therefore

include in our voyage, under the general heading of
Aristotelian rhetoric, the earlier rhetoric of a dominant

poetics.

We will take our theory of Aristotelian rhetoric

from Aristotle himself, the practice we will get from
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Cicero, the pedagogy from Quintillah, the transformation (by

generalization) from fiionysius Of Halicafnassus, Plutarch,
and the anonymous author of On the Sub1ime.

A.4.2.

Aristotle's Rhetoric.

Aristotle defines rhetoric as "the art of extracting

from each subject whatever degree of persuasion it can
sustain," or as "the faculty of discovering hypothetically

that which in any given case is most likely to be
persuasive."

What is perhaps more important than such

definitions is the fact that rhetoric is a techne (it is

not an empirical datum), that is: rhetoric is the means Of
producing something that mav either be or not be. whose

origin is in the creative agent, not in the created object:
there is no techne of things which are either natural or

necessary, and discourse is neither of these.

Aristotle

considers discourse (the oratio) to be a message and

relegates it to a branch of information systems.

Book I of

the Rhetoric is the book of the transmitter of the message,

it is the book of the orator: it mainly deals with the

conception of arguments, inasmuch as these depend on the

skill of the orator, on his ability to adapt his matei^ial
and himself to the audience, this according to the three

recognized genres of discourse (judicial, deliberative,
epideictic).

Bookll is the book of the receiver of the

message, the book of the public: here the subject is the
■■ ■
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emotions and, again, arguments; but this time the author
fqcuses on their reception (and not, as before, on their
formulation).

Book III is the book of the message itself:

it deals with the lexis or elocutio, in other words, with,
"fiaures." and with taxis or dispositio. or the order of the

parts of discourse.

A.4,3.

The Probable.

Aristotle's Rhetoric is, above all, a rhetoric of

argument, of reaspnihg, of the elliptical syllogism (the

enthymeme); it is a voluntarily diminished logic, adapted to
the standards of the public, that is, to common sense, to

current opinion.

Extended to literary productions (where it

does not properly apply), it favors an aesthetic of the

public rather than an aesthetic of the v;ork.

That is why,

mutatis mutandis and all (historical) allowances being made,
it is well suited to our so-called mass culture, ruled by

Aristotelian "verisimilitude" or what the public believe is

possible.

How many films, magazines, commercials exploit

the Aristotelian principle: "Better a probable impossibility
than an improbable possibility"; it is better to tell what

the public believes is possible, even if it is

scientifically impossible, than to tell the public what is
in reality possible if it is likely to reject it by the
censure of collective current opinion.

Of course it is

■

tempting to make a connection between this mass rhetoric and

Aristotle's politics; it was, to be sure, a politics of the

"golden mean," which favored a balanced democracy situated
in the middle class and charged with easing tensions between

rich and poor, majority and minority; hence a rhetoric of
good sensej voluntarily subject of the "psychology" of the
publie.

A.4.4.

The Rhetorica of Cicero.

In the second century (B.C.), Greek rhetors flee to

Rome> schools of rhetoric are founded; functioning by age
group, the schools practice two kinds of exercises: the

suasoriae■ "persuasive" sorts of dissertations (primarily in
the deliberative genre) for children, and the controversiae
(in the judicial genre) for older students.

The oldest

Latin tract is the Rhetorica ad Herennium. attributed

sometimes to Cornificius and sometimes to Cicero: this [the

attribution to Cicero] is what the Middle Ages did; along

with Cicero's De Inventione. they never stopped copying this

manuscript. Which became fundamental in the art of writing.
Cicero is an orator who speaks of the art of oratory, whence

a certain practical application of Ariatotelian theory (thus

little really new with regard to that theory) .
rhetorics include: (1)

Ciceronian

(assuming that he wrote it) the

Rhetorica ad Herennium. a sort of digest of Aristotelian

rhetoric; the classifying of "questions," however, replaces

in importance the theory of the enthymeme: rhetoric becomes
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professionalized.

At this point the theory of the three

styles (the low, the high, and the middle) emerges.

(2) De

Inventione Oratoria. a youthful (and incomplete) work,

,

purely judiciary, devoted to the epicheireme, an expanded

^

syllogism in which one of the premises or both are followed

by their proofs: it is the "good argument." (3) De Oratore.
a work held in high regard up to the nineteenth century ("a

masterpiece of good sense," "of right and sound reason," "of
noble and lofty thought," "the most original of the
treatises on rhetoric"): as if recalling Plato, Gicero

moralizes rhetoric and reacts against teaching it in the
schools: it is the Claim of a well-rounded man against

specialization.

The work takes the form of a dialogue

(Crassus, Antonius, Mucius Scaevoia, Rufus, Cotta): it
defines the orator (who must have a general education) and

briefly reviews the traditional parts Of Rhetoric (Inventio,
ni sonsitto. Elocutio).

oratory in Rome.

(4) Brutus. a history of the art of

(5) Orator. an ideal portrait of the

orator; the second part is more didactic (it will be amply
annotated by Peter Ramus): specific attention is given to

the theory of the oratorical "number," later revived by
Quintilian.

(6) The Topoi; this is a digest, done from

memory in eight days while traveling by boat to Greece after
Mark Sintony seized control of Rome, of the TopOi of
Aristotle; of greatest interest to us is the structural
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network of the ouaestio (of. in B.1.25).

(7) The Partitio:

a little manual of questions and answers in the form of a
dialogue between Cicero the father and Cicero the son, and
the most dry and least moralistic of Cicero's treatises (and
consequently the one I like best): this is a complete
elementary rhetoric, a kind of catechism with the added

advantage of providing within its scope the classifications
of rhetoric (this is the meaning of partitio: systematic
overlay).

A.4.5.

Ciceronian Rhetoric.

Ciceronian rhetoric is marked by the following
characteristics: (a) dread of the "system"; Cicero is

completely indebted to Aristotle, but he disintellec
tualizes him, he tries to put some "taste" and "naturalness"

into his theory; this de-structuration will reach its
extreme in the Rhetorica sacra of St. Augustine (Book IV of
On Christian Doctrine): these are not rules for eloquence,
which the Christian orator needs nonetheless: here he must

merely be clear (that is an act of charity), he must stick
to the truth more closely than to the terms, etc.: this

pseudo-naturalistic rhetoric triumphs again in the

Scholastic conception of style; (b) the nationalization of
rhetoric: Cicero attempts to Romanize it (this is the
significance of Brutus). "Romanness" emerges as a concept;

(c) the mythical collusion of professional empiricism
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(Cicero is an attorneY immersed in political life) and the

appeal of the great cultures; that collusion is heir to an
immense fortune: the culture becomes the political arena;

(d) the elevation of style: Ciceronian rhetoric inaugurates
the development of the elocutio.

A.4.6.

The Works of Ouintilian.

■

There is a certain pleasure in reading Quintilian: he
is a fine professor, not a fine phrase-maker, not too

moraiizing; his mind was at the same time discriminating and
perceptive (a combination which always appears amazing to
the world).

The epitaph which M. Teste dreamed for himself,

Transiit classificando. might well be applied to Quintilian.
He was an official rhetor, appointed by the state; his

reputation, extraordinary during his own lifetime, suffered
an eclipse after his death, but glittered anew from the
fourth century on.

Luther preferred him above all others;

Erasmus, Bayle, La Fontaine, Racine, Rollih held him in high
esteem.

In twelve books, De institutione oratoria outlines

the education of the orator from childhood on: it is a

Complete pedagogical plan (and in that sense an institutio).

Book I deals with jprimary education, regular instruction
with the grammarian, then with the rhetor; Book II defines
rhetoric and its functions, Books III through VII deal with
the Inventio and the Dispositio. Books VIII through X with

the Elocutio (Book X gives practical advice for "writing"),
■ ■ ■ 21-'

Book XI treats of the minor elements of rhetoric: the Action

(bringing the discourse into play) and the Memory, Book XII
sets forth the moral qualities required of the orator and
establishes the advantage of a general, liberal arts
education.

A.4.7.

Instruction in rhetoric.

Education consists of three phases (today we speak of

three stages): (1) apprenticeship in language: speaking
errors are not to be permitted in nurses (Chrysippe would

have them schooled in philosophy), in slaves, nor in
teachers.

Parents should be as well—educated as possible.

The child begins, in Greek, to learn to read and write;
students are no longer beaten; (2) the grammaticus (the

meaning is more comprehensive that than of our word

"grajnmar": it is, if you will, the whole of grammar); the
child probably keeps its company from about the age of seven

on; he attends courses in poetry and reads aloud (lectio);
he writes compositions (narrating fables, paraphrasing

poetry, expounding on maxims), he receives lessons in acting
(animated recitations); (3) with the rhetor; he must begin
instruction in rhetoric at an early age, probably around

fourteen years, at puberty; the master must incessantly

provide examples by way of extravagant performances, (but
the students must refrain from rising up to applaud him).

The two principal exercises are: (a) narrations. summaries
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and analyses o'f narrative arguments, historical events, ,
elementary panegyrics, comparisons, explorations of
commonplaces (theses), discourse according to an outline

(preformata materia); (b) declamations. or discourse on
hypothetical cases; these are in effect exercises in the

rational fiction (therefore, the declamatio is already very
Close, to the work).

The extent to which this pedagogy

forces speech is obvious: the latter, surrounded on all
sides, is forced Out of the pupi1, as if there were an

innate inhibition against speaking, as if a single
technique, a single type of education, was necessary to put

an end to silence, and as if this speech once grasped,
conquered at last, represented a good "objective"

reTationship with the world, a firm command of the world, of
others.,

A.4.8.

Writing.

In his treatment of tropes and figures (Books VIII

through X), Quintilian establishes an original theory of
"writing."

BoOk X is addressed to those who would write.

How does one obtain the "well-founded facility" (firma
facilitas), that is, how ■ does one overcome that innate
sterility, the terror of the blank page (facilitas), and
how, at the same time does one manage to say something,

without getting carried away by prattle, wordiness,
logorrhea (firma)?

'

Quintilian drafts a propedeutic for the
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writer: one must read and write a great deal, imitate models

(do pastiches), revise extensively, but after having let it

"rest," and one must know when to stop.

Quintiliah notes

that the hand is slow, the pace of thought is different from

that Of writing (this is a surrealist problem: how to

achieve a writing as fast . • • as itself?); biit the hand)S
slowness is beneficial: one must hot dictate, writing should
remain attached, not to the voice, but to the hand, to the
muscle: it Should settle into the slowness of the hand: no
quick rough drafts.

A.4.q.

unified rhetoric.

The final venture of Aristotelian rhetoric: its

dilution by syncretism: Rhetoric no longer opposes itself to

Poetics, and this advances the transcendent notion which

today we call "Literature"; no longer merely constituting an
object of instruction, it becomes an art (in the modern

sense); from this time on it is a theory of writing and a
treasury of literary forms.

This transition can be summed

up in five points: (1) Ovid is often credited by medieval
writers with having postulated the relationship betv;een

poetry and the art of oratory; this connection is likewise
affirmed by Horace in his Ars Poetica. v/here the subject is
often rhetoric (theory of style); (2) Dionysius of

Halicarnassus, a Greek and a contemporary of Augustus, in
his De compositione verborum. abandons the principal element
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of Aristotelian rhetoric (the enthymeme) in order to

concentrate on a new value: the arrangement of phrases;

hence the autonomous notion of style: style is no longer

based in logic (the subject precedes the predicate as the

substans precede the accidens); the order of words is
variable, guided solely by the valueslof rh^
Moralia of Plutarch includes a short treatise, "Quomodo
adulescens poetas audire debeat." (how to read the poets to

young folks), which moralizes on the nurturing of literary
aestheticsv

of Plato, Plutarch attempts;tp^^^

lift the 'indictment which Plato brought against poets.

How?

Precisely by connecting Poetry and Rhetoric; rhetoric
provides a way of distinguishing imitated (often

reprehensible) action from the (often admirable) art which
imitates; only v;hen one is able to read poetry aesthetically
can one read it morally; (4) On the Sub1ime (Peri Hypsous),
an anonymous treatise written in the first century

(erroneously attributed to Longinus and translated by

Boileau) ,| is a sort of "transcendental" rhetoric; the
sublimitas is, in effect, the "height" of style; it is the

same style as in the expression "to have style"; it is
literariness defended in a passionate, inspired tone: the

myth of "creativity" begins to appear. (5) In the Diaiogue
of Orators (whose authenticity is occasionally questioned),

Tacitus politicizes the causes of the decadence of
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eloquence: the cause is not the "poor taste" qf the era^ but

rather the tyranny of DOmitian, which imposes :silence upon
the Forum and leads to an uncommitted art, pOe:tty; but by

itself, eloquence tends toward "Literature," it penetrates

and constitutes it (eloquentia comes to signify literature).

A.5

NEO-RHETORIC

A.5.1.

A literary aesthetic.

We call the literary aesthetic (Rhetoric, Poetics, and
Criticism) which dominated the Greco-Roman world fiom the

second to the fourth century A.D. neo^rhetoric;or the second

sophistic.

This is a period of peace, of conwierce, of

trade, favorable to a leisure class, particulatly in the

Near East (Middle East).

Neq-rhetoric was truiy ecumenical:

the same figures were treated by St. Augustine, in African

Latin, by the pagan Libanius, by St. Gregory of Nazianzus in
eastern Greece.

That literary empire constructed itself

under a double reference: (1) the sophistic: the orators of

Asia Minor, without political connection, want to revive the

name of the Sophists, with no pejorative connotation, whom
they think to imitate (Gorgias); these orators of pure pomp

enjoy great glory; (2) the rhetorical: it encompasses

everything; no longer entering into opposition with another
related notion, it absorbs all speech; it is no longer a

(special) techne. but a general field of knowledge, and even
more: a national education (on the order of the schools of
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Asia Minor).
appointed

The sophistes is a school superintendent,

by the emperor for one city; the master who is.

his subordinate is the rhetor.

in this collective

institution not a single naine can be cited; there is a
sprinkling of authors, a movement known only through
Philostratus' Life of the Sophists.

education in speech consist?

Of what does this

One must once more distinguish

the syntagmatic rhetoric (the parts of discourse) from the
paradigmatic rhetoric (the figures).

A.5.2.

The declamatio. the ekphrasis.

At the syntagmatic level, one practice is predominant:
the declamatio (melete).

It is an improvisation governed

by a theme: for example, Xenophon refuses to survive
Socrates, the Cretans claim to possess the tomb of Zeus, a

man is in love with a statue, etc.

The improvisation

relegates the order of the parts of discourse (disputatio)
to a secondary level; being pointlessly persuasive but
purely ostentatious, the discourse de-structures itself,
atomizes itself irt the careless pursuit of brilliant

passages arranged according to a rhapsodic model.

The

principle of these pieces (it had the advantage of very wide

appeal) was the descriptio,:or ekphrasis.

The ekphrasis is

an anthologized fragment, transferrable from one discourse
to another.

This is an organized description of places
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and/or, personages (the origin of the topoi of the Middle
Ages).

Thus a new syntagmatic unit, the piece, appears.

Less extensive and narrower in scope than the traditional

parts of discourse, greater than the periodic sentence, this
unit (landscape, portrait) departs from oratorical discourse

(juridical, political) and easily adapts itself to narration
and the sustained romance. Once again rhetoric "eats" into
the literary.

A.5.3.

At.t.icism/Asianism.

At the paradigmatic level, the new rhetoric establishes
the value of "style"; it thoroughly valorizes the following
ornaments: the archaism, the loaded metaphor, the

antithesis, the rhythmic clause. Invoking its opposite,
this baroquism enters into a conflict between two schools:

(1) Atticism, upheld chiefly by the grammarians, guardians

of the pure vocabulary (moral castrators for the sake of

purity who still exist today); (2) Asianism returns, in Asia
Minor, to the development of a style exuberant to the point
of being strange, based, like mannerism, upon surprise
effects; here the "figures" play an essential role.

Clearly, Asianism has been condemned (and continues to be by
all of classical aesthetics, the heir of Atticism).
A.6.

THE TRIVIUM

A.6.1.

The agonistic str\icture of—education.
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In antiquity, the pillars of education were essentially
oral instruction and whatever transcriptions it gave rise to

(acroematlaue^ treatises and the technai of the speech ^
writers).

From the beginning of the eighth century,

teaching takes an agonistic turh,, reflecting an intense,it
competitive situation.

The,independeht schools (in contrast

to the monastic or episcopal schools) are left to tke;

■ t,

initiative of a master--Often very young i(20 years); all of
them inhpired by the success of ?d)elard > a gifted student ■

who "defeats" his master, steals his paying public

and

^

founds a school:; the fihancial circumstances are tightly ;
bound to the battle of ideas: the same Tlbelard obliges his
master Guillaume de Campeaux to renounce realism: he :i

liquidates it from all points of view; the agonistic
structure coincides with the commercial structure: the
scholasticos (professor, student or former student) is a

combatant of ideas and a professional rival

There are two

school exercises: (1) the lesson, the reading and

;

explication of a fixed text (Aristotle, the Bible),
includes; (a) the expositio. which is an interpretation

according to a subdividing method (a sort of analytic

mania), (b) the auaestiones. which are the propositions pfv
the text that can be argued for or against: one debates and

ends in refuting; each reason must be presented in the form

of a complete syllogism; the lesson fell gradually into

29

neglect because of its tedium.

(2) The debate is a

;

ceremony, a dialectical joust conducted under the
supervision of a master.

After several days, the master

determines the solution.

What matters on the whole is the

sporting culture: one trains athletes of speech: speech is
the object of an established prestige and power;
aggressiveness is encoded.

A.6.2.

Writing.

As for writing, it is not subject, as it is today, to
the value of originality; that which we call the author does
not exist.

There are different dutieS: attending the

classical text, the only text studied and in some sense

managed, like renewable capital: (1) the scriptor recopies
purely and simply; (2) the compilater adds to that which he
copies but never anything bf his own; (3) the commentator

often intrudes into the recopied text but only in order to
make it intelligible; (4) and finally, the auctor presents

his own ideas but always based on other authorities.

These

duties are not sharply defined in a hierarchy: the

commehtator, for example, could have the prestige which a
great writer enjoys today (such was the case in the twelfth
century with Peter Helias, nicknamed "the commentator").
What anachronistically we would call the writer, therefore,

is in the Middle Ages essentially: (1) a transmitter: he
preserves an absolute content which is the classical

' ■ - '■
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treasure, the source of authority; (2) a controller; he has

the right to "break up" the works of the past by unbridled
analysis and to recompose them (if they had had such an idea

in the Middle Ages, "creation," a modern notion, would have
been sacrificed to the profit of structure).

A.6.3.

The Septennium.

In the Middle Ages "culture" is taxonomy, a functional
network of "arts," that is obedient to the rules of language

(the etymology of that period compared art to arctus. v/hich
means articulated), and these "arts" are called "liberal"
because they do not lead to profit (in contrast to the

mechanical arts and manual activities): they are general,
sumptuous languages.

These liberal arts take the place of

that "general education" which Plato rejected in the name
and in favor of the true philosophy, but which were finally
reclaimed (by Isocrates and Seneca) as propadeutic to
philosophy.

In the Middle Ages, philosophy is diminished

and passes into the general education as one art among many

(Dialectica).

It is no longer philosophy that the general

education prepares its students for, it is theology which
stands supreme above the seven arts, the Septennium.

are there seven?

Why

Already in Varro one finds a theory of

liberal arts: at this point there are nine (our own with the

addition of medicine and architecture; this structure is
revived and codified during the fifth and sixth centuries by
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Martianus Gape11a, an African pagan who established the

hierarchy of the Septennium in an allegory, The Marriage of
Mercury and Philology.

Here, philology designates total

knowledge: Philology, the learned yirgin, is betrothed to

Mercury; she receiyes as a wedding gift the seyen liberal
arts, each presented with its symbols, its costume, its
language; for example, Grammatica iS an oId woman who has
suryiyed Athens and wears Roman garments; in a small iyory

box, she holds a knife and a file for correcting the errors
of children; Rhetorica is a beautiful woman, whose clothes
are adorned with all the figures; she carries weapons
destined to harm her adyersaries (the coexistence of

persuasiye rhetoric and ornamental rhetoric).

These

allegories of Martianus Capella were widely known; one finds
them erected on the facades of Notre Dame and the Cathedral

of Chartres, and portrayed in the works of Botticelli.
Boethius and Cassiodorus (sixth century) elaborated the

theory of the Septennium. first by incorporating Aristotle's
Organon into Dialectica, and second by postulating that the
liberal arts are inscribed for all eternity in the diyine
wisdom and in the Scriptures (the Psalms are full of

"figures"): rhetoric receiyes the Christian sanction (enjoys
the protection of Christianity; it can legally emigrate from
Antiquity to Christendom and thence into the modern era).
This priyilege will be confirmed by Bede during the
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Carolingian era.

Of what does the Septennium consist?

It

must first summon that which it opposes: on the one hand

technology (the "sciences" as impartial languages, form part
of the Septennium) and on the other theology; the Septennium

organizes human nature in its humanity: that nature can only
be overturned by the Incarnation which, if it is applied to
a classification, takes the form of a subversion of

language: the Creator becomes the creature, the Virgin
conceives, etc.: in hac verbi copula stupet omnis regula.
The Seven Arts are divided into two unequal groups, which

correspond to the two paths (viae) of wisdom: the Trivium
includes Grammatica. Dialectica and Rhetorica; the

Ouadrivium includes Musica. Arithmetica. Geometria,
Astronomia (medicine would be added much later).

The

opposition between the Trivium and the Ouadrivium is not
that of letters and sciences; it is rather that of the
7

secrets of speech and the secrets of nature.

A.6.4.

The diachronic plav of the Trivium.

The Trivium (which is our only concern here) is a

taxonomy of speech; it attests to the persistent effort of

the Middle Ages to fix the place of speech in man, in nature

and in creation.

Speech is not at the time, as it has since

become, a vehicle, an instrument, the means to "something
else" (soul, thought, passion); it consumes everything
mental: not actual experiences, not psychology: speech is

.
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not expression but instant construction.

What is of

interest in the Trivium. therefore, is less the continuum of

each discipline than the play of these three disciplines

among themselves, throughout the ten centuries: from the
fifth to the fifteenth century, the leadership of one art

over the other emerged in such a way that each period of the

Middle Ages was placed under the domination of one of these

arts: by turns, it is Rhetorica (fifth through seventh
centuries), then Grammatica (eighth through tenth

centuries), then Loaica (eleventh through fifteenth
centuries) which dominates its sisters and reduces them to
the level of poor relations.

RHETORICA

A.6.5.

Rhetorica as supplement.

Ancient Rhetoric has survived in the traditions of some

of the Roman schools of Gaul and with some Gallic
rhetoricians such as Ausonius (310-393), arammaticus and

rhetor of Bordeaux; and Sidonius Apollinaris (430-484),

bishop of Auvergne.

Charlemagne inscribes the rhetorical

figures in his scholastic reform, after the Venerable Bede
(673-735) had completely Christianized the rhetoric (a task

initiated by Augustine and Cassiodorus) by showing that the
Bible itself is full of "figures."

Rhetoric did not

dominate for long; it was very quickly "stuck" between
Grammatica and Loaica: Rhetoric becomes the poor parent of
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the Trivium. destined only for a beautiful resurrection at

the time when it becomes possible for it to be reborn

through "Poesie" and, in the most general fashion, under the
name of Belles-lettres.

This weakness of Rhetoric—

diminished by the triumph of emasculated languages, grammar
(remember the file and knife of Martianus Capella) and

logic—is perhaps due to the fact that it is entirely
carried away with ornament, that is toward the reputedly

inessential, with regard to truth and fact (the first

apparition of the referential spectre):^ it appears then as
"what comes later.

This medieval rhetoric sustains itself

essentially on the treatises of Cicero (Rhetorica ad
Herennium and De Inventione) and Quintilian (better known by

teachers than by students), but itself produced primarily
related treatises on ornament, figures, "color" (colores
rhetorici), and afterwards, poetic arts (artes
versificatoriae): the dispositio did not approach the

"commencement" of a discourse (ordo artificialis. ordo

naturalis); the designated figures are above all

amplification and abbreviation; style is ascribed to the

three genres of the wheel of Virgil:^® gravis. humilis.
mediocrus. and to the two ornaments: facile and difficile.

A.6.6.

Sermons. dictamen, poetic arts.

The domain of Rhetorica encompasses three canons of
order (three formal rules), three artes.
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I. Artes

serntQGinandi: these are the oratory arts ih general (the

object of rhetoric properly speaking), that is then,

essentially, sermons or parentici^^ discourse (exhorting to
virtue); the sermons may be written in two languages:
sermones ad poPulum (for the people of the parish), written
in the vernacular, and sermones ad clerum (for the Synods,

the schools, the monasteries), written in Latin;
nevertheless, everything is prepared in Latin; the

vernacular is merely a translation.

11. Artes dictandi, ars

dictaminis. epistolary art; the development of

administration since Charlemagne carried with it the theory

of administrative correspondence: the dictamen (the practice
of dictating letters), the "dictator" is a recognized

profession which is taught; the model is the dictamen of the

papal chancellery: the stylus romanus surpasses everything,
a stylistic notion takes hold, the cursus, the flowing
together of a text, filled with the criteria of rhythm and
accentuation.

III. Artes poeticae: poetry at first

comprised part of the dictamen (the opposition of

prose/poetry has long been hazy); then the artes poeticae
take charge of the rhvthmicum. borrow Latin verse from
Grammatica. and begin to aim at the "literature" of

imagination. A structural reshaping begins, which, at the
end of the fifteenth century, sets the Fi rst Rhetoric (or

general rhetoric) against the Second Rhetoric (or poetic
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rhetoric), from which the Poetic Arts such as those of
Ronsard proceed.

GRAMMATICAL

A.6,7.

Donatus and Prician.

After the Invasions, the cultural leaders are the

Celts, the English and the Franks; they had to learn Latin
grammar at the famous schools of Fulda, Saint Gall and

Tours; grajtunar is introduced into general education through
poetry, liturgy and Scripture; it includes, along with
grammar in the strict sense, poetry, prosody ahd, some
figures.

The two great grammatical authorities of the

Middle Ages are Donatus and Priseian.

I. Donatus (circa

350) produces an abridged grammar (ars minor) which deals
with the eight parts of the sentence in the form of

questions and responses, and an expanded grammar (ars

major).

Donatus' success is enormous; Dante places him in

heaven (the opposite of Priscian); some of this v;ritings
would be among the first ever printed, along with the
Scriptures; he has given his name to some elementary

treatises on grammar, the Donats.

II. Priscian (late fifth

century, early sixth century) was a Mauritanian, a professor

of Latin in Byzantium, nurtured on Greek theory and in
particular the grammatical doctrine of the Stoics.

His

Institutio qrammatica is a normative grammar (arammatica

reaulans), neither philosophical nor "scientific"; it falls
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into two abridgements: tbe Priscianus minor deals with
construction, the Priscianus major deals with morphology.
Priscian leaves numerous examples borrowed from the Greek
Pantheon: the man is Christian, but the rhetor is pagan (one

sees the advantage of this dichotomy).

Dante dispatches him

to hell, in the seventh circle, that of the Sodomites:

apostate, drunk, madman, but reputedly a great genius.
Donatus and Priscian represent absolute law—except when

they do not agree with the Vulgate: grammar is therefore
unable to be so normative, since one believes that the

"rules" of locution have been invented by the grammarians;

they have been distributed largely by Commentatores (such as
Peter Helias) and by grammars in verse (a very big fashion).

By the end of the twelfth century, Grammatica includes
grammar and poetry, it deals with "precision" and
"imagination," with letters, with syllables, with the

phrase, with the complete sentence, with figures, with
prosody; it relinquishes very little to Rhetorica: some

figures.

It is a fundamental science, linked to ethica

(part of the common wisdom, expressed through the text,
outside of theology): "the science of speaking well and

writing well," "the cradle of all philosophy," "the first
nurse of all literary studies."

A.6.8.

The Modistae.
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In the twelfth century Grammatica again becomes
speculative (as it had been with the Stoics).

That which

one calls Speculative Grammar is the work of a group of
grammarians called Modistae. because they wrote the

treatises titled "De modis significandi"; many came from the
monastic provinces in Scandinavia, then called Dacia. and

more precisely from Denmark.

The Modists were denounced by

Erasmus for having written a barbaric Latin, for the

confusion of their definitions, for the excessive subtlety
of their distinctions; in fact, they had produced the
foundations of grammar for two centuries, and we even owe to
them certain speculative terms (for example, instance).

The

treatises of the Modists take two forms; the modi minores.

in which the subject is presented modo positive, that is,
without critical discussion, in a brief, clear and very
didactic manner; and the modi maiores. presented in the form

of auestio disputata. that is, with pros and cons, with more
and more specialized questions.

Each treatise contains two

parts, in the manner of Priscian: Ethvmologia (morphology)-
spelling errors are common to this period and correspond to
a false etymology for the word Etymology—and Diasynthetica

(syntax), but the treatise is prefaced by a theoretical
introduction bearing on the connections between the modi
essendi (being and its properties), the modi intelligendi

(taking possession of being under its aspects), and the modi
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siqnifieandi {level of language).

The modi significandi

themselves comprise twO strata: (1) the

COrresponds with the■ modi signandi: its elements are: vox .

the; aLCcoustic sighif ret:, arid dictio . ; word-concept, generic t ;
semanteme ( in dolor. doled / itvis the idea of sorrow) ; the

modi signandi do not vet come within thO: scppe of the

grammarian: vox. the phonic signifier >- h
Philosophus-naturalis (to the iphonetician, an we wonld say) , ;
and dictio. referring bac3c to an inert state of the wond,

which is not yet animated in any respect, escapes the

logician of language (it comes under what we would now call

lexicograpliy) ; (2) the level of the modi signifieandi is
attained when it: attaches an international meaning to tire

designation:. : ;At "t

word,v;chec]<;ed in :the

dictio:. is quiterproducfcive p it ns: perceived in so far as fit

is;^ "construGtihTe" :Jfit - fits " into' the super ior unity Of the ■ , /,
:sentence; it restores a great deal then to the speculative
grammarian and the logician of language.

Also, far from

blaming the Modists, as sometimes happened, for having
reduced language to nomenclature, we should congratulate

them for having done everything to the contrary: for them,

language does not begin with tlie dictio and the
significatum. that is , wi th t)ie word-sign, but with the
cons jgnificatum or const.ructible . that is , the connection or

the inter-sign: a privileged status is accorded to syntax,

to inflection, to order—and not to semantics--in a word, to

structure, which would perhaps he the hest way to tts^^slate
mndns sianificandi.

There is then a definite relationship

between the Modists and some of the modern structuralists

(Hjelmslev's glossematics, Ghomsky's competence): language
is a structure, and that structure is, as it were,

"guaranteed" by the structure of being (modi essendi) and by
that of the mind (modi intelliaendi): there is a grammatica
universalis: this will be something nev7, as it is commonly
believed that there are as many grammars as there ere

languages: Grammatica una et eadem est secuhdum substantiam
in omnibus linauis. licet accidentaliter varietur.

Non ergo

arammaticns sed philosophus proprias naturas rerum

diliaenter considerans . . . arammaticam invenit.

(Grammar

is one and the same in all languages, as far as substance is
concerned, although it can vary by accident. Therefore it
is not the grammarian but: the philosopher who, by examining
the nature of things, discovers grammar.)
LOGICA (OR DIALECTICA)

A.6,9.

Studium and Sacerdotium.

Loaica dominates in the twelfth and thirteenth

centuries: it pushes Rhetorica aside and absorbs Grammatica.
This struggle took the form of a conflict between schools.
In the first half of the twelfth century, the schools of

Chartres develop particularly the teaching of Grammatica (in

the broadest sense of the word): this is the studium, which
is of literary orientation; on the contrary, the school of
Paris develops theological philosophy: this is the
.<^acerdotiuin.

Paris is victorious over Chartres, the

.q^cerdotiuin over the studium: nrammatica is absorbed into
Loaica. and this brings with it a revival of folk

literature, a taste for the vernacular, a retreat of

humanism, a movement toward the professional disciplines
(medicine, law). Previously, Dialectica was preserved in
the Topics of Cicero and the work of Boethius, the first

interpreter of Aristotle; then, in the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries, after the second (massive) infusion of

Aristotle, it was preserved in all the Aristotelian logic
12

which dealt with the dialectic syllogism.

A.6.10. The disputatio.

Dialectica is the art of lively discourse, discourse

between two people. This dialogue is in no way Platonic; it
is not a question of principally subjecting the beloved to
the master; here, the dialogue is aggressive; it is
undertaken in order to enjoy a victory which is not

predetermined: this is a battle of syllogisms, Aristotle

staged by two partners. Also, Dialectica becomes confused
with an exercise, a mode of expression, a ceremony, a sport,
the di sputatio (what one might call a symposium of

adversaries). The procedure (or protocol) is that of Sic et.
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Non.

One collects contradiGtory-eyidence on a given

question.

The exercise is presented to ah opponent and a

respondent; the respondent is ord.inarily the candidate: he

responds to the objections presented by the opponent; as in
the Conservatory competitions, the opponent is on call: he

is a friend or he is appointed; one poses the thesis, the

opponent poses the argument (sed contra) the candidate
rpc;pnnds (respondeo): the conclusion is presented by the
master who presides.

The disputatio invades everytbing;

it is a sport: the masters dispute among themseives, in
front of the students, once a week; the students dispute for
examinations.

One gestures to the head—master for

permission to debate (there is a parodic echo of these

gestures in Rabelais). All of this is codified, ritualized
in a treatise which governs the disputatio meticulously in
order to prevent any deviation from the discussiont uhe Ars
obligatoria (fifteenth century).

The thematic material of

the disputatio comes from the argumentative part of

Aristotelian Rhetoric (by way of the Topics); it allows
insolubilia. propositions which are very difficult to prove;

impossibilia. propositions which seem impossible to

everyone; sophismata. cliches and paralogisms, which serve
ag the hnit of disputationes.

11 ■ The neurotic sense of the disputatio.

If one wishes to evaluate the neurotic aspect of such
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an exercise, ;he must of course retrace the mache

of the

GreeKs, that; sort of conflictual sensibility which makes any
contradiction between the subject and himself intolerable to
the Greek (and later to the West in general): driving a

partner to contradict himseif is enough to reduce him, to
eliminate him, to annul him: Callicles (in the Gorgias)

chooses not to respond rather than to contradict himself.

The syllogism is the same weapon which permits that
liquidation. it is the knife which cuts but is itself

indestructible.

The two disputants are two torturers who

try to mutilate each other (whence the mythical episode of
Abelard, the castrated castrator).

So volatile was"the

neurotic explosion that it had to be codified, the
narcissistic injury limited.

They turned logic to sport

(just as today we turn soccer into everyone's conflictual
outlet, especially the underprivileged or the oppressed): it
is the eristic.

Pascal saw the problem: he wanted to avoid

being in such a conflict with another; he wanted to

"reprove" him without mortally wounding him, to rise to his
level (to complement him) when it was necessary only to

"complete" him (and not to conquer him).

The disputatio had

vanished, but the problem of rules (ludic, ceremonial) of

verbal play remains: how do we dispute today in our writing,
in our colloquia, in our meetings, in our conversations and,
to a certain extent, in the "scenes" of our private lives?

HavG wG SGttled. our scotg with thG syllogism (or morGly

concGalGd it)?

Only an analysis of intGllGCtual discoursG

will somGday be ablG to answGr this prGcisGly.-*"^
A.6.12. Restructuring of thG Trivium.

Wg saw that thG thrGG liberal arts were waging a battle

of prGCGllence^^ among themselves (to the final advantage of
Loaica): it is truly the symbol of the Trivium, in all its
fluctuations, that is significant.

Its contemporaries had

been aware of this: some of them had tried to restructure in

their own way the entire spoken culture.

Hugh de Saint-

Victor (1095-1141) opposes the theoretical, practical and
mechanical sciences to the logical sciences: Logica recovers
the Trivium in its entirety: it is all the science of

language.

St. Bonaventure (1221-1274) tries to discipline

all knowledge by submitting it to Theology; in particular
Loaica. or the science of IntGrpretation, includes

Grammatica (expression), Dialectica (education), and

Rhetorica (persuasion); once more, even if it is for the

sake of opposing it to nature and to grace, language absorbs
all that is mental.

But above all, (because it anticipates

the future), as far back as the twelfth century something
that must be called letters separates itself from

philosophy; for John of Salisbury, Dialectica operates in
all disciplines where the outcome is abstract. Rhetorica,
on the Other hand, picks up whatever Dialectica doesn't
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want, it is the field of the hypothesis I in anr^i ont rhetoric
the hypothesis opposes itself to the thesis as the

contingent to the general, see below B.1.25.), that is to
say, all that which involves concrete circumstances (Who?

What? When? Why? How?); in this way an opposition appears
which will have great mythical success (it still exists):

that of the concrete and the abstraGt: the letters (stemming
from Rhetorica) will be concrete, philosophy (stemming from
Dialectica) will be abstract.
A.7.

THE DEATH OF RHETORIC

The third introduction of Aristotle: the Poetics.

We have seen that Aristotle had entered the West twice:

once in the sixth century through Boethius, and once in the
seventh century from the Arabs.

through his Poetics.

He came in a third time

This Poetics is little known in the

Middle Ages, except through distorted abridgments.; But in
1498, the first Latin translation from the priginal was
published in Venice; in 1503, the first Greek edition
appeared; in 1550, Aristotle's Poetic is translated and

commented upon by a group of erudite Italians (Castelvetro,
Scaliger—of Italian origin—the bishop of Veda).

In

France, the text itself is little known. It is through
Italianism that it enupts in seventeenth century France.
The generation of 1630 brings together Aristotle's

disciples; the Poetics lent to French classicism its
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principife eiement--a theory of verisimilitude^

It iSy the

code of the literary "creation," of which theoreticians are y

the authors, the critics.

Rhetoric, wliicli took as its

■ S'

principal object "writirig well," style, is restricted to
education, where in fact it triumphs.

It is the domain of

the professors (the Jesuits).

A.7.2.

Triumphant and moribund.

Rhetoric is triumphant; it reigns over education.
Rhetoric is moribund; limited to this area, it falls little

by little into serious intellectual discredit.

This

discredit \g ushered in by the promotion of a new value—
evidence (fact, ideas, feelings) which is sufficient unto .y
itself and is independent from language (or is believed to
be independent), or at least pretends to use language as

nothing more than an instrument, a medium, a means of

expression.

From the sixteenth century on, "evidence" takes

three directions: personal evidence (in Protestantism),
rational evidence (in Cartesianism), and the evidence of the

senses (in empiricism).

Rhetoric, when it is tolerated at ;

all (in Jesuit education), is no longer a complete logic but
merely a color. an ornament that one keeps a close v;atch on
in the name of "realism."

There had undoubtedly been some

postulation of this new spirit in Pascal, since it is to him
that one credits the Tuiti-Rhetoric of modern humanism.

What

Pascal calls for is a rhetoric (a "persuasive art") that is
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mentalistic, sensitive, instinctual, partaking of the

complexity of things (of "subtlety"); eloquence consists not
in applying an external code to discourse, but in gaining
awareness of the thought which is inherent in us, a way of
being able to reproduGe that tempo which we use when we
speak to one another, bringing out the truth, as if one had

discovered it oneself, by oneself.

The system of discourse

does not have intrinsic characteristics (clarity or

symmetry), but depends on the nature of thought, which, in
order to be "right," must conform itself to language.

A.7.3.

The Jesuit teaching of Rhetoric.

Late in the Middle Ages, we have seen, the teaching of
rhetoric was sacrificed somev/hat; it subsisted, however, in
some colleges in England and Germany.

In the sixteenth

century, this heritage organizes itself, takes a stable

form, at first at the gymnasium of St. Jerome, maintained at
Liege by the Jesuits.

This college is imitated at

Strasbourg and at Nimes.

The form of education in France

for three centuries is established.

colleges follow the Jesuit model.

Very quickly, forty

The education given here

is codified in 1586 by a group of six Jesuits: this is the

Ratio Studiorum, adopted in 1600 by the University of Paris.
This Ratio devotes itself primarily to the "humanities" and

to Latin rhetoric; it invades all of Europe, but its

greatest success is in France.

The force of the new Ratio

undoubtedly becomes identified--in the ideologogy whicb it
legitimizes-^with a scholarly discipline, a discipline of

thought and a discipline of language.

Ih this humanistic

education, Rhetoric itself is the noble subject; it

dominates everything,

The only scholarly prizes are the

values of Rhetoric, of transTation and of memory, but the

value of Rhetoric, assigned to the conclusion of a special

examination, desighates the top student, who is called from
that time on the imperator or the tribun (we should not

forget that speech is power—and even a political power).
Up to around 1750, beside the sciences, eloquence

constitutes the only prestige; in this epoch of the decline
of the Jesuits, rhetoric is revived somewhat by the
Freemasonry, f. ■

A.7.4.

Treatises and Manuals.

The codes of rhetoric are innumerable, at least up to

the eighteenth century.

Many (in the sixteenth and

seventeenth centuries) are written in Latin; these are

scholarly manuals drafted by the Jesuits, notably P. Nunez,
Susius and Soarez.

The "Institution" of P. Nunez,

for

example, comprises five volumes: the preparatory exercises,
the three principal parts of rhetoric (invention,

arrangement and style) and a moral section (the "wisdom") .
Meanwhile, rhetorics in the vernacular flourish (here we
will cite only those in French) .

At the end of the

fifteenth century the rhetorics are chiefly poetics (the art

of writing poetry or the minor arts of the Second Rhetoric);
it is necessary to cite: Pierre Fabri, "The Great and True

Art of Complete Rhetoric" (six editions from 1521 to 1544)
and Ahtoine Foclin (Foquelin), "French Rhetoric" (1555)
which includes a clear and complete classification of

figures.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, up to

about 1830, the Treatises of Rhetoric dominate; these

treatises present in general: (1) the paradigmatic rhetoric
(the figures), (2) the syntagmatic rhetoric (the "oratory
structure"); these two facts are felt to be necessary and

complementary to such an extent that in 1806 a trade journal
brings the two most famous rhetoricians together: the

Figures, by Du Marsais, and the oratory construction by Du
Batteux.

We will cite the best known of the treatises.

For

the seventeenth century, it is undoubtedly the Rhetoric of
Pi Bernard Lamy (1675): this is a complete treatise on

speech, useful "not only in the schools, but also in every

phase of 1i fe: when vou buv. when vou sell": evidently it
rests upon the principle of the exteriority of language and

thought.

One has a "picture" in the mind, one tries to

"reproduce" it with words

For the eighteenth century, the

most celebrated treatise (and moreover the most intelligent)
is that of Du Marsais . (Treatise of Tropes. 1730); Poor and

unsuccessful during his lifetime, Du Marsais frequented the
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anti-religious circle of Holbach and worked as an

encyclopedist; more than a rhetoric, his work is a

linguistics of the transformation of meaning.

At the end of

the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth
centuries, many treatises, absolutely oblivious to the
revoluntionary change happening at the time, were published
(Blair, 1783; Gaillard, 1807--The Rhetoric for Young Ladies

—Fontanier, 1827—recently republished with an introduction
by G. Gennette).

In the nineteenth century, rhetoric

survives only artificially, under the protection of official
regulations; even the titles of the tracts and manuals

change in a significant way: 1881, F. de Caussade: Rhetoric
and Literary Genres: 1889, Prat: Elements of Rhetoric and
Literature.

Literature once more "carries" rhetoric before

choking it completely; but in its final gasp, classical

rhetoric completely; but in its final gasp, classical
rhetoric competes with the "psychology of style."

A.7.5.

The end of Rhetoric.

Nevertheless, to say in a comprehensive way that

Rhetoric is dead, it should be possible to specify what

replaced it, because—we have seen this a good deal through
this diachronic survey—rhetoric must always be read within
the structural play of its neighbors (Grammar, Logic,
Poetics, Philosophy): it is the play of the system, not each

of its parts individually, that is historically significant.
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We will follow this problem through in order to finish some

lines of inquiry: I.iwe would have to trace thdvpresent
lexicology of tlie word; what happens to it?

It sometimes

recaptures its original contents, personal interpretations
coming from writers, not from rhetors (Baudelaire and the

cojivplete rhetoric! Valefy, Poulhanl; but■ above all, we would
have to reorganize the actual fieid of its connotations:

■Peiorative herei^^iarialytic there,^^:reevaluated i '
elsewhere

so as to putline the ideological prPcess of

ancient rhetoric.

II. In education, the end of the

rhetorical treatises is difficult to date, as it always is

in such cases; once more, in 1926, a Jesuit from Beirut
writes a textbook on Rhetoric in Arabic; again, in 1938, a

Belgian, M.J. Vuillaume, publishes a manual of rhetoric; and
the classes in Rhetoric and advanced Rhetoric disappeared

only a very short time ago.

Ill. To exactly what extent and

under what circumstances has the science of language taken

charge of the field of ancient rhetoric?

At first there had

been a transition to a psyclio-stylistic (or stylistic of

expressivity)

pursued?

but today where is linguistic mentalism

From all of rhetoric, Jakobson has retained only

two figures, metaphor and metonymy, making them the symbol
for the two axes of language; for some the formidable work

of classification carried out by ancient rhetoric still

seems useful, especially if one applies it to the marginal
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field of communication or of the signification of the

advertising image

where it is not yst used up.

In any

case, tliese contradictory evaluations clearly show the

present ambiguity of the rhetorical phenomenon: prestigious
object Of intelligence and insight; awesome system which an
entire civilization developed to an extreme in order to
classify, that is, in order to think its language;
instrument of power; scene of historic conflicts whose

reading is compelling if one puts precisely that object back
into a manifold history where it expands; but also an

ideological object, pushed into ideQlogy by the advance of
that "other thing" which replaced it and today forces an
indispensable critical distance.
B.

B.0.1.

THE NETWORK ■

The demand for classification.

All the treatises of antiquity, particularly the post-

Aristotelian, demonstrate an obsession for classifying (the

, term oratory Eartitio:^ itself gives huch evidence): rhetoric
openly lend.s itself to that sort of classification
(materials, rules'^ divisions,: genres,tstyles).

ClasSificatioh itself is th® object of discourse: the
announcement of the outline of the treatise, an intense

. discussion: of the classifications proposed by predecessors.

The passion for classifying always seems pointless to those
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not participating: wliy argu© so bitterly over tlie placement
the ptoposi116,: sonteti nies put at the end of the exordiuiTi

and sometimes at the beginning of the narratio?

Yet most of

the time--and this is normal—the taxonomic choice implies

an ideological choice: there is always something at stake in
the placement of things: tell itie how voii classify. I'11 tel l

you who you are.

One cannot then adopt, as we will here for

didactic purposes, a canonical classification which will
voluntarily "forget" bhenuAeroUsyariatibns

that have taken the plan of the techne rhetorike as their
object, without first saying a word about these
fluctuations.

B.0.2.

The divisions of clessificati on.

irhe account of Rhetoric itself is made essentially
according to three different divisions (here I am

simplifying).

I. For Aristotle, the starting point is the

techne ( a speculative institution with the ability to
determine that which can and cannot be); the techne

(rhetorike) gives rise to four types of operations, which
are the parts of the rhetorical art (ahd not in the least

the parts of discburse, of the oratio): (1) Pisteis, the

working out of "proofs" (invent10). (2) Taxis. the placing
Of these proofs thrbughout the discourse and in a certain

order (dispositio), (3) Lexis, putting arguments into verbal
form (at the level of the sentence) (elocutio), (4)

54

Hypocrisis, the performance of the total discourse by an
orator who must make himself a comedian {actio).

These four

operatiohs are examihed three times (the means of which are
the: concern of the inventio): frCm the poiht of view of the
trahsmitter of the message/ from the point of view of the

recipient, and froni the point of view of the message itself
(A.4.2Vi.

In accordahce

notion of

the techne (this is a skill), the Aristotelian divi sion
places the process of structurina a discourse in fhp

foreground: iactiye operation) and; relegates its structure 

(discourse as product) to;the backgrbun^l

II v For Cicero,

the; starting point is thP doctrina dicendi i that is ^ no
longer a speculative techne; but an acquired knowledge with

practical applications; from the taxonomic point of view,

the doctrina dicendi gives rise toi (1) a jforce, a work, vis,
oratoris, which depends upon the specified Atistote1ian:

operatidns; (2y:a product, ot if you Pill, a form, the
oratio, by which it is connected to the extended parts that
comprise it; (3) a subject, content (a type of content), the
auaestio, which depends upon the genres of discourse. ' Thus

begins a certain autonomy of the work v/ith regard to the
labor that produced it

III. A conciliator and pedagogue,

Quintilian combines Aristotle and Cicero; his

starting point is indeed the techne. but it is practical
and pedagogical techne. not a speculative one; it aligns:
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(1) the operations (de arte)—which are those of Aristotle

and Cicero, (2) the pperator (de artifice), >('3) the work
itself (he_oEere) (these last two themes are annotated, but
not subdivided).

B.0.3.

The stake Of classificatibh: the site of the plan.

One is able to stake but the location of these

taxonomic fluctuations with precision (even if they do seem
infinitesimal): it is the place of the place, the

dispositio ■ the order of the parts of discourse.

connected to, this dispositio?

What is it

There are two possible

options: either one considers the "plan" as a "putting in
order" (and not as a ready-made order), as a creative act of
distributing material—in a word, a task, a

structuring——and thus one connects it with the preparation
of a discourse.

Or one takes the plan in its state of

production, the structure fixed, and thus connects it with
the work, the ofatio.

If is either a dispatching of

material, a distribution, or it is a grid, a stereotyped
form.

In short, is the order active, creative, or passive,

created?

Each option has had its proponents who have pushed

it to its. limit: some cohnect the dispositio with the

probatio (the discovery of proofs); others have connected it
with the eloGutio: this is a simple verbal method.

We know

the extfeines to which this problem has been carried up to
the threshold of modern times: in the sixteenth century,
5'6'

Ramus, violently anti-Aristotelian (the techne is an

affectation contrary to nature), radically separates the

dispositio from the inventio: order is independent from the
discovery of arguments: first the research of arguments,
then their organization, called method.

In the seventeenth

century, the decisive blows against a declining rhetoric

were leveled precisely at the reification of the scheme, the

dispositio. which had ended in conceiving a rhetoric of the
product (and not of the process).

Descartes discovers the

coincidence of invention and order not among the rhetors,
but among the mathematicians; and for Pascal, order is a

creative value, sufficient to begin something new (it cannot
be a ready-made grid, exterior and prior).

"So thev can't

say that I have said nothing new: the disposition of
material is new."

The connection between the order of

invention (dispositio) and the order of presentation (ordo)
and notably the deviation and the orientation

(contradiction, inversion) of two parallel orders,
therefore, always has a theoretical range: this is entirely

a conception of literature, which is always in play, as
witnessed by the exemplary analysis which Foe gave his own
poem, "The Raven": in order to write the work, he started
from What appears to be the last thing the reader grasps (as

an "ornament"), knowing the melancholy effect of the
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nevermore (e/o). and thus raising the narrative and metric
form to the level of invention.

B.0.4.

The rhetoric machine.

If, ignoring these stakes, or at least opting

resolutely for the Aristotelian diyision, we superimpose the
sub-classifications of ancient rhetoric in some way, we
obtain a canonical distribution of the different parts of
the techne. a network. a tree, or better yet, a huge

creeper which descends level by level, now dividing a

generic element, now reuniting scattered parts.
network is a linking up.

stocking machine.

This

One thinks of Diderot and the

"One can regard it as a singular and

unique faculty of which the fabrication of the work is the
outcome . . ."

In Diderot's machine, what one feeds in at

the entrance is textile material, what one takes out at the

exit are the stockings.

In the rhetoric "machine," what one

puts in at the start, barely emerging from a native aphasia,
are the raw materials of reasoning—facts, a subject; what

one finds at the end is a complete, structured discourse,
fitted out for persuasion.

B.0.5.

The five parts of the techne rhetorike.

Our starting line, then, will be constituted by the

different operations-matrices of the techne (it is
understood from the preceding that we connect the order of
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parts, the dispositio. with the techne and not with the

oratio: that is what happened with Aristotle).
/

In its

/

fullest extension, the techne rhetorike includes five

principal operations; we must stress the active, transitive,
programmatic, operative nature of these divisions.

It is

not the elements of a structure that matter, but the acts of

progressive structuring, as the verbal form (with verbs) of
definition amply demonstrates:
1.

INVENTIO

invinire quid dicas

2.

DISPOSITIO

inventa disponere
Taxis
3.

to organize that
which one has found

ELOCUTIO

onare verbis

to

add ornament of

words and figures

Lexis
4.

to find what

to say

Euresis

ACTIO

opere et pronuntiare

Hypocrisis

to perform the
discourse as an

actor: gestures and
diction
5.

MEMORIA

memoria mandare

to call upon memory

Mneme

The first three operations are the most important (Inventio.

Dispositio. Elocutio); each supports an ample network of
subtle notions, and all three have sustained rhetoric since
antiquity (especially Elocutio).

The last two (Actio and

Memoria) were quickly sacrificed, since rhetoric is not only
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carried on through the spoken discourse (declainatipn) Of
lawyers or politicians, or "conferenceers" (epideictic

genre), but also later, more or less exclusively, tiirough

"works" (writihgS)V

Little wonder, though : that these two

parts do not hold much interest.

The first (actio) because

it refers to a dramaturgy of the speech (that is, to a

hysteria and a ritual); the second because - it postualfes a.
standard level of stereotypes, a fixed inter-text,
mechanically transmitted.

But since these last two

operations are absent from the written work (as opposed to

the oratio)

and since, as with the ancients, they did not

call for any classifications (but only brief commentaries),
they can be eliminated here from the rhetoric machine.

Our

tree, then, includes only three trunks (1) INVENTIO, (2) ,
DISPOSITIO, (3) ELOCUTIO.

Let US specify, however, that

between the concept of techne and these three parts yet
another level intervenes: that of the "substantial"
materials of discourse: Res et verba.

I do not think that

this ought to be translated simply as Things and Words.
Res, says Quintilian, are auae sianificantur. and Verba.
auae significant; in short, at the level of discourse, the

signifieds and signifiers.

Res. that which is already

destined for meaning, constituted from the outset by'^:^

signification material; verbum, which is the form already in
search of meaning to fuifill it.
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it is the res/verba

;

paradigm that counts, the relatiohship, the complementarity,
the exchange, and hot the definition of each term.

Since

the n1spositio turns on the contents (tes) and on the

(jtscursive form (verba) at one and the same time, the first
division of our tree, the first diagram of our machine, must
inscribe itself like this:

Techne rhetorike

Verba

Res

1.

INVENTIO

2.

DISPOSITIO

B.l.

THE INVENTIO

n 1■ 1 ■

ni scoverv and not invention.

3. ELOCUTIO

inventio refers less to invention (arguments) than

to discovery: overything exists already; it needs only to be
rediscovered: it is more an "extractive" than a 'creative
notion.

This is corroborated by the designation of a

"place" (the Topic) , from which one can extract the

arguments and to which one must return them: the inventio is

a prnrPSs tvi 3 araumentorum) . This idea of inventio implies
two feelings: on the one hand a very secure conf idence in
the power of the method, of the track: if one casts the net
of argumentative forms over the material with a good
technique, one is sure to haul in the contents of an
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excellent discourse; on the other hand, the conviction that
the spontaneous, the unmethodical, brings in nothing: the
nothingness of the original speech corresponds to the power
of the ultimate speech; man cannot speak without being
delivered of his speech, and for that delivery there is a
particular techne, the inventio.
B.1.2.

To convince/to move.

TWO majob tracks,bran^ out fromthe^ invent

rs : ;

logic, the other is psychology: to convince and to move. To
ronvince (fidem facere) demands a display of logic or

pseudo-logic which is called roughly the Probatio (the
, d6maih.of ::.Wrbbrs";)v:;;:acfcbr^^
matter of doing righteous violence to the spirit of the
budience, whose cliarabter or ^psychoiogic^l disposrbipa, a
then, has nothing to do with it: the proofs carry their own
force. TO
impellere). on the contrary,
cohSisbs in thinkingVaf a message which,is;

■ftseif, but in its rnbended purpose^./tne:^
vf: ■
should inspire, mobilizing subjective or moral proofs. To

begin with, we descend along the track of the probatio (to
convince) , to return later to the second term of the
dichotomy (bbCmove) . All these "descei^ts^' wi11 he

^ larepresehted graphiealiy^:i
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B.1.3. T^rtinical prnnfR and proofs external to_tlie
t Rchnigue.

Plstela, the proofs? One habitually watches out foi
this word, but for us it has a scientific connotation whose
absence Itself defines the rhetorical EisielS. It would be
better to say: convincing explanations, ways of persuasion,
means of influence, mediators of confidence (fidas). The

binary division of the Eisteis is well-bnown: there are the

arguments that are outside of the t££hll4 (Ejsteis atechnoi)
and the arguments that are part of the techne (pisteis
entechnoil. In Latin: prohationo° inarti ficialos/.
,vtifiriales: in French (B. Lamy): evtrinseques/

intrinseaues. This opposition is not difficult to grasp if
"

f

we keep reminding ourselves that it is a techne; a

speculative institution, a means of producing that which is
probable or improbable; in other words, that which is
neither scientific (necessary) nor natural. The proofs
nf the techn4, then, are those that escape to the

freedom of creating the contingent subject; they are found
outside the orator (the operator of the techne); they are

the subject's inherent arguments. On the other hand, the

proofs within the techn4 depend upon the orator's ability
to argue.
I

B.I.A. Proofs oiitsif^p

the techne.

What can the orator do with the atechnoi proofs? He
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cannot direct them, because they are in themselves inert; he

can only arrange them, assert them through a methodical

placement. What areVthey? They are fragments

reality

that pass directly^ into this dispositio by a simple
development, not by transforraatioh. Or better yet, they are
elements of the "dossier," which one cannot invent; (deduce)
and which are furnished by the;case itself, by the client

ifor the time being, we: are in thd purely judicial). These

Atechnoi are classified;in;the following way: (1)
■hhp praeiuducia. previous arrests, jurisprudence (the

problem is to destroy them without attacking them head-on) ;
( 2 )' the rurnores , public t^estimony,.the consensus of an
entire community; : (3) rnnfessions uhder torture (tormenta,

guaesita): any mbrai: cdnviction:, ;but;especially- a social
donviction with, regard to torture: antiquity ackiiowledged

the right to torture slaves: but. ;not free men; (4) documents
ftahiilae) : contracts , agreements , transactions between

individuals, up to and including forced relations (theft,

premeditated murder, robbery, insult) ; (5) the oath
Y^uaiurandum) :,it is the element which relies most heavily

on: a game of combinations, taetics, language: one can agree
or refuse to swear, one accepts or refuses the path of
another , etc.; 16): testimonies (testimonia) : these are

; essentially bigh-minded:testimonies, at least for Aristotle,
ihey issue eitherifrom the ancient poets (Solon citing Homer
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in order to support Athens' claims to Salamine), or from

proverbs, or from notable contemporaries; these are, then,
if anything, "citations."
The meaning of the atechnoi.

The "extrinsic" proofs belong to the judiciary (the
rumores and the testimon^a can serve deliberative and

epideictic purposes); but one can imagine that they might
also be useful in private life, to judge an action, to know
what to praise, etc. This is what happened to Lamy. For
him, the extrinsic proofs could support fictive

representations (novels, theater); one must take care,
however, that they are not factors which themselves make up

part of the argument; they are simply elements of the
dossier that come from the outside, from an

institutionalized reality; in literature, these proofs would
serve to compose the novel-dossiers (it happened

that . . .), which would renounce all bound writing, all

prolonged representation, would give only fragments of a
reality already constituted in language by the society.
This is indeed the sense of atechnoi: they are elements

constitute by social language which pass directly into th^
discourse without being transformed by any technical
operation of the orator, the author.
'

B.1.6.

Proofs within the techne.
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The arannients which depend entirely upon the ability of
the orator ^r^ieteis entechnoi) oppose themselves to these

fragments of social language which are conveyed directly, to
the crude state (except the development of an arrangement),
indeed, the Enteclinos means: that which revives the oratory
practice, because the material is transformed in a

persuasive way by a logical operation. This operation, in
all strictness, is double: induction and deduction. The
pntechnoi. then, is divided into two types: (1) the

axemplum (induction), (2) the euthymeme (deduction). It is

not a question of scientific induction and deduction, but
simply a "public" induction and deduction. These two ways
are compulsory: All orators, in order to persuade,
ao^nnctr^te uy ^v;.mples or enthymemes; there-js no other way
to do it (Aristotle). Yet a sort of quasi-aesthetic
difference, a difference in style, creeps in between the

example and the euthymeme: the exemplum produces a gentler

persuasion, more highly valued than the vulgar one; it is an
illuminating force, gratifying the pleasure inherent in all

\ comparison; the enthymeme—which is stronger, more vigorous
i -produces a violent, turbulent force and profits from the

(energy of the syllogism; it works a veritable abduction; it
Us the proof in all the force of its purity, its essence.
B.1.7.

The exemplum.

The oxemolurn (parMMsma) is rhetorical induction: one
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procssds from one part,icu.1 ar to another particular, to the
general, by an implicit chain* from an Object, one infers a
"■ ' ■ * ■

■ ' 'Z'Z

class, then to this class one adds a new object.

The

exemplum can have no; other dimension; it may be a word, a

fact, a set of facts or an account of these facts.

Tt is

persuasive similarity, an argriment;by analogy: one finds the

right exemPla if one has; the gift pf recpgnizing analogies—
and also, of course, their opposites.

As its Greek name

indicates, it tends toward the paradigmatic, the metaphoric.
As far back as Aristotle, the exemplum has been subdivided

into the parable and the fable; the real covers historical
examples, but also mythplpgical examples, being opposed not
to the imaginary but to that which one inyents oneself.

The

parable is a bi^iuf ^^ comparison; the fgble ilogos) a
collectiPn of actions.i These indicate the narrative nature
of the exemplum. which is going to flower historically *
B.1.8.

The exemplary fiaure: the imago.

At the beginning of the first century A.D. , a new form

of the exemplum appears: the exemplary personage (eikon,

imago) . investing a figure with the incarnation of a virtue*
Gato iila virtutem viva imagpr (Gicero) . , A repertoire of

these;"imagoes" is established for use in the schools of the
Rhetors (Valerius Maximus, under Tiberius: Factorum ac

dictorum memorabilium libri novemi. followed much later by a

version in verse; ; This coilfectiPn bf fig^
V

'j t-

•

■ ." 't''

■V'"

.
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enjoys immense

success in the Middle Ages; erudite poetry sets forth the

definitive cafion of these ;pcrsphag;es

a:yeritahle Olympus of :

archetypes^ which God has placediahto the cour

history;

the imago virtutis occasionally: seizes upon people of very

minor importance who are destined for great fame, such as

Amyclas, the ferryman who will carry "Caesar and his
fortune" from EpiruS,

: to Brindisi in a Storm (poverty gnd^^^ ^ ^;

sobriety); there are numerous "imagoes" in the works of
Dante.

The very fact that one could put together a

repertoire of exemola emphasizes well what one might call
the structural inclination of the exemplum; it is a

detachab1e piece which expressly carries with,it a meaning
(heroic portrait, hagiographic narrative); clearly,

therefore, one can trace its development from fragmented and

allegorical writing to today's major presses: Churchill,
John XXIII are "imagoes," examples destined to persuade us
that we must be courageous, that we must be good.
B.1.9.

Arguments.

,

'l .

Opposite the exemplum. the mode of persuasion by
induction, there is a group of deductive modes, the

aroumenta.

The ambiguity of the word argumentum is

significant here.

The most common ancient meaning is: the

subject of a scenic fable (the argument of a comedy by
Plautus), or rather: articulated action (in contrast to
muthos. a collection of actions).
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For Cicero, it is at the

same time "a flctive thing that could happen" (the

:

plausible), and "a conceivable idea employed to convince,"
whose logical scope Quintiliah makes even more clear: "the

way to prove one thing or another, to confirm that which is
;in doubt by that which is not."

Thus an important duplicity

becomes evident: that of "reasohing" ("all forms of public

reasoning," says a rhetor), tainted, easily dramatizable,

which participates in the intellectual and the fictional,
the logical and the narrative, at one and t)^e same time
(donvt we recapture this ambiguity in a good number of

modern "essays"?)-

The appearance of the argumenta, which

begins here and will go on to consume all of the probatao

right up to its end, opens on a masterpiece, the tabernacle
of the deductive proof, the enthvmeme. which is sometiines
called commentum. commentatio. the literal translation of

the Greok enthumema (all reflection of consciousness), but
jnore dften by a significant synecdoche: argumentum.

B.1.10. The enthvmeme.

The enthymeme received two successive significations
(which are not contradictory).

I. Fot the Aristotelians, it

is d syllogism based on a the simiiarity Of signs and not on
the true and immediate (as is the case with the scientific

syllogism); the enthymeme is a rhetorical svllogism,
developed uniquely at the public level (as one says: to get
down to someone's level), to set out from the probable, that
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is, to set out from what the public thinks; it is a
deduction whose value is concrete, posed with a view to its

presentation (it is a sort of acceptable spectacle), in
opposition to the abstract deduction carried out solely for
analysis; it is a public reasoning, handled easily by
uneducated men.

By virtue of its origin, the enthymeme

achieves persuasion, not demonstration.

For Aristotle, the

enthymeme is sufficiently defined by the probable character
of its premises (the probable admits of contraries): whence
the necessity to define and classify the premises of the

enthymeme.

(See below: B.1.13, 14, 15, 15.).

II.

A new

definition prevails from Quintilian on and is completely
victorious during the Middle Ages (since Boethius): the

enthymeme is defined not by the contents of its premises,

but by the elliptical character of its articulation: it is
an incomplete syllogism, a shortened syllogism: its parts
are "neither as many nor as distinct as the parts of the

philosophic syllogism":

one can omit one of the two

premises or the conclusion; therefore it is a syllogism
truncated by the suppression (in the expression) of a

proposition whose reality seems incontestable to man and

which is, for that reason, simply "preserved in the spirit"
(en thumo).

If one applies this definition of the master

syllogism to all of culture (in a peculiar way, it repeats
to us our own death)—^and although its premise is not simply
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probable, it cannot be an entliymeme in the strictest sense- ■
one may have the following emthymemes: man is mortal. '
therefore Socrates is mortal: Socrates is mortal because all
men are; Socrates is a man and therefore mortal; etc.

One

might prefer the more factual example of this funereal model

proposed by Port-Royal: "a11 bddies which reflect light on
all sides are uneven; the moon reflects liaht on all sides;
therefore the moon is an uneven bodv." and all the

enthymemic combinations that can be extracted from it (the
moon is uneven because it reflects light on all sides,

etc.).

In effect, this second definition of the enthymeme

is chiefly that of Port-Roval Logic. and one clearly sees

why (or how): classical man believes that the syllogism is
developed wholly in the mind: ("the number of the three

propositions is in good proportion with the breadth of the
mind"): if the enthymeme is an imperfect syllogism, it can
be so only at the level of language (which is not that of

the "mind"): it is a perfect syllogism in the mind, but it

is imperfect in its expression; in short, it is an accident
of language, ,a lapse. .

B.1.rl. Metamorphoses of the enthymeme.

Here are some variables of the rhetorical syllogism:

(1) the prosvlloqism. a series of syllogisms in which the
conclusion of one becomes the premise of the following; (2)

the sorite (soros. the heap), an accumulation of premises or
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succession of truncated sy.l logi sms; (3) the eplcheireine.

(often cornmented upon in antiquity), or developed syllogism,
each premise being accompanied by its proof; the

,

epicheirematic structure may extend to all five parts of the

discourse: the proposition, the major argument, the
assumption or minor argument, the lesser proofs, the

disposition or conclusion: A . .. . because . . . Now B . . .
because . . . therefore

(4) the apparent enthvmeme. or

an argument based on a confidence game, a play of words;
• •

•

t

\

(5) the maxim. (gnome, sententia): a very elliptical,

monodic form, it is a fragment of an enthymeme, the rest of
which is potential: "one must not give one's children too
much knowledge (because they will reap the envy of their
fellows).

A significant revolution, the sententia

migrates from the inventio (from reasoning, from the
syntagmatic rhetoric) to the elocutio. to style (figures of

amplification or diminution); in the Middle Ages, it blooms,
contributing to form a treasury of citations on all subjects
of wisdom: phrases; gnomic verse learned by heart;
collections classified in alphabetical order.

B.1.12. The Pleasure of the enthvmeme. ,

Since the rhetorical enthymeme is made for the publie
(and does not come under the scrutiny of science), the

psychological considerations are pertinent, and Aristotle
insists on them.

The enthymeme has the charm of a
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promenade, a voyage.

One sets out from the point that does

not need to be proved and proceeds toward another point that
does need to be proved.

One has the agreeable feeling (the

same feeling that arises from vitality) of discovering
Something new by a sort df natural contagion or capillary
attraction which extends the known (the opinabie or
assentable) toward the unknown.

Nevertheless, in order to

give all its pleasure, the process must be supervised:
reasoning should not be carried too far, and it must not run
the full course of its stages to come to a conclusion: this
taxes the patience (the epichiereme should be used only on

great occasions), because one must reckon with the ignorance
of the 1isteners (ignorance is precisely that incapacity to
infer by numerous stages and to follow an argument for a

long time); or rather: one must exploit this ignorance and
give the listener the feeling that he himself has put a stop

to it by his own mental effort.

The enthymeme is not a

truncated syllogism by default or dissipation, but because
it must allow the listener the pleasure of doing all he can
in the construction of the argijment: it is part of the

pleasure one gets from working out a given grid oneself
(cryptograms, games, crossword puzzles).

Port-Royal,

although always judging language faulty compared to the
mind—and the enthymeme is a linguistic syllogism—

recognizes this pleasure in incomplete reasoning.
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"This

suppression of part of the syllogism flatters the vanity of
those to whom one speaks.

By leaving some things to their

intelligence and by cutting the discourse short, one makes
it stronger and more lively";

therefore, one sees the

moral transformation in comparison with Aristotle: the

pleasure of the enthymeme is attributed less to a creative
autonomy of the listener than to an excellence stemming from
concession. given triumphantly as the sign of a surplus of

thought over language (thought supersedes language in terms
of length): " . . . one of the chief beauties of a discourse

is to be full of meaning and to give the mind occasion to
form a thought more extended than its expression . . ."

R.I .13. The enthvmematic premises.

The place from which we leave to take the pleasant

route of the enthymeme is the premise.

This place is known,

certain, but not with a scientific certainty: it is our
human certainty.

What do we hold, then, as certain? (1)

that which falls under the senses, that which we see

and understand: reliable indicators, tekmeria; (2) that

which falls under sense, that which people are in general

agreement on, that which is established by law, that which
has passed into usage ("it is handed down from the gods,"
"thou Shalt honor thy father and thy mother," etc.): these

are the probabilities, elkota. or generically, the probable
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(eikos): (3) between these two types of human

"certainities

Aristotle puts a looser,category: the

seraeia, the sign (a thing which serves to make another
thing understood, per quod alia res intelliaitur). ;

B.1.14. The tekmerion■

the reliable indicator.

The te3cmerion is the reliable indicator , the necessary

sign, or even "the indestructible sign," that which is what
it is and which cannot be otherwise.
birth: this is a reliable indieatbr

has had relations with a man.

A woman has given
(te3merion)

that she

This premise comes very close

to the one that inaugurates the scientific syllogism,
although it rests only on a universality of experience.

As

always, when one exhumes this old logical material (of

rhetoric) , one is amazed to see it function perfectly well

in the works of the culture of mass appeai--to the point
that asks oneself; if Aristotle isn't the philosopher of this
culture and consequently doesn't found the critique which

holds sway over it; in effect, these works easily mobilize
"physical evidence" which serves as an origin for implicit

arguments, for a certain rational perception of the
development of an anecdote.

In Goldfinger. there is an

electrocution by.water: this is familiar and doesn't need
to be explained; it is a "natural" premise, a tekmerion:
elsewhere (in the same film) a woman dies because someone

has painted her body with gold; here one has to know that

. 15

the gold paint prevents the skin from breathing and
therefore causes asphyxiation: this, being rare, needs to be
f

explained; therefore it is not a tekmerion. or at least it
is "disconnected" from an antecedent certitude (the

asphyxiation causes death).

It goes without saying that

f

the tekmeria don't historically have the beautiful

stability that Aristotle gives them: public "certainty"

depends on public "knowledge," and that varies with time and
society.

In order to recover Quintilian's example (and to

refute it), I must be assured that certain populations don't
establish the connection between the birth and the sexual

union (the child sleeps in the mother; God awakens it).

B.1.15. The eikos, the probable.

The second type of (human, non-scientific) "certitude"
which can serve as the premise of the enthymeme is the

probable, a capital notion in the eyes of Aristotle.

It is

a general idea resting on the judgment which men develop by
experience and imperfect deduction.
it be called the preferable).

(Perelman proposes that

In the Aristotelian probable,

are there two nuclei: (1) the idea of the general. and its

opposite, the universal: the universal is necessary (it is
an attribute of science); the general is not necessary (it
is a human "general," determined on the whole statistically,

by the opinion of the majority); (2) the possibility of
contrariness: certainly the enthymeme is received by the
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public as a kind of syllogism; it seems to start from an

opinion in which one believes, "strong as iron"; but
according to science, the probable admits the contrary:
within the limits of human experience and morai life, which

are those of the eikos, the contrary is never impossible:
one cannot predict with (scientific) certainty the
potentials of a free being: "he who is in good health will

live to see another day," "a father loves his children," "a
burglary committed without forceful entry must have been
done by someone known to the household," etc.: very well,

but the contrary is always possible; the analyst, the

rhetbrician, feels keenly the force of these opinions, but

in all objectivity, he holds them at a distance, introducing
them by an esto (it may be) vjhich dilutes its force in the
eyes of science, where the contrary is never possible.
i

f

8,1.16. The semeion. the sian.
t

t

The semeion. the third possible division of the
enthymeme, is a more ambiguous factor, less sure than the

tekmerion.

Traces of blood imply a murder, but this is not

certain; the blood may be the result of a nosebleed, or of a

sacrifice.

In order for the sign to be conclusive, there

must be other concomitant signs; or better yet, in order to

stop the sign from being polysemic (the semeion is in
effect the polysemic sign), it must have recourse to a total
context.

Atalanta was not a virgin, since she ran the woods

77

with boys: for Quiiitiliah, it is yet to be proved; the
proposition itself is so:Uhcerbaih that it throws the
semeion out of the techne of the orator, who cannot seize
upon the semeion in order to transform it, by enthymemati c
inference, into a certainty.

B.1.17. Practice of the enthvmeme.

Insofar as the enthymeme is a "public" reasoning, it is
permissible to extend its practice out of the judiciary, and

it is possible to retrieve it from rhetoric (and from
antiquity).

Aristotle himself studied the practical

syllogism, or enthvmeme which coneludes with a determinate

act.

The major premise is concerned with a current maxim

(eikos); in the minor premise, the agent (for example, I
myself) verifies what happens in the situation covered by
the major premise; it concludes with a behavioral decision.
How does it happen, then, that so often the conclusion
contradicts the major premise and that the orator resists
that knowledge?

It is because, very often, there is a

deviation between the major and the minor premises: "To
drink alcohol is harmful to a man; I am a man; therefore, 1

should not drink."

enthymeme, I drink.

And yet, in spite of this nice

It is because I am "discreetly"

reminded of another major premise: the sparkling, icy,

thirst-quenching drink that does one good (a major premise
well-known to advertising and bistro conversation).

Another

possible extension of the enthymenie: in "cool" and rational

language,; both distant and public at the saree time, such :
ilistitutiona1 languages as public d i plomacy, for oxsimple:

Chinese students, having demonstrated in front of the

American embassy in;Moscow (March 1965), the de^
having been put down by the Russian police, and the Chinese

government having protested against the suppression, a
Soviet memo responds to the Chinese protest with a fine

epicheireme, worthy of Cicero (see above B.1.11.): (1) Major
premise: eikos. genera1 opinion: Diplomatic standards exist
which all nations respect; (2) Proof of the major premise:
the Chinese themselves respect these standards of courtesv

in their ov/n country; (3) Minor premise: Now. the Chinese
students in Moscov; have violated these standards ; (4) Proof

of the minor premise: this is an account of the
demonstration (insults .'acts of violence and other deeds
falling within the provisions of the penal code); (5) the

conclusion is not stated (this is an enthymeme), but it is
clear: it is the memorandum itself as a rejection of the

Chinese protest: the adversary has been placed in a bind
between the eikos and himself.

B.1.18. The Place, topos, locus.

The classes of enthymematic premises having been

determined, they must still be filled and premises be found:
one has the principal methods, but how to invent the

contents?

It is always the Same agonizing question that

Rhetoric poses and that Rhetoric tries to answer: what to
say?

From whence the importance of the reply, as witnessed

by the scope and the success of that part of the Inventio

which is charged with furnishing the contents of the
argument and which begins henceforth: the Topic.
premises may indeed be drawn from certain Places.

place?

The
What is a

Aristotle says it is where a multiplicity of

oratorical arguments coincide.

The places, says Port-Royal,

are "certain general authorities from which one can rettieye

all the proofs which one makes use of in the diverse
material that one deals with"; or even (Lamy): "general
opinions which remind those who consult them of all the
aspects from which one can consider a subject."

However,

the metaphoric approach to place is more significant than
its abstract definition.

One is presented with many

metaphors for identifying the place.

Place?

To begin with, why

Because, says Aristotle, in order to remember

things, it helps to recollect the place where they are found

(the place, therefore, is an element of the association of

ideas, of a package, of a discipline, of a mnemonic; the
places, therefore, are not the arguments themselves but the
compartments in which they are stored.

Thence the whole

image uniting the idea with a space and that which it
reserves, with a locality and a quarrying: a region (where
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one can find argumentsl, the vein.of sdme ore. a circle, a
sphere■

a source. a pit. an arsenal. a treasury.

and even a

pigeon hole (W. D. Ross) ; "The places , Du Marsais sa:ys, are
the Cells where everyone can go to take, as it were, the
material of a discourse and arguments on all sorts of

subjects."

A scholastic logician, exploiting the domestic

nature of the place, compares it to a tag which indicates

the contents of a receptacle (pvxidum indices) ; for Cicero,
the arguments coming from places, will come forth by
themselves for the purpose of debate just as the "letters
for making words" will fall into place: the places, then,

form that very particular reserve that constitutes the

alphabet: a body of forms deprived of meaning in themselves,
but, by selection, combining to make meaning, arrangement,

actualization.

With regard to place, what is the Topic?

It

seems that one can distinguish three successive definitions
or at least three aspects of the word.

The Topic is—or has

been--(1) a method, (2) a grid of empty forms, (3) a store
of occupied forms.

B.1.19.

The Topic:

a method.

Originally (according to the Topica of Aristotle,
anterior to his Rhetoric) . the Topic was a collection of

commonplaces of the dialectic, that is, of the syllogism
founded on the probable (intermediate between the scientific
and the possible) ; then Aristotle made a method of it, more

•' i' - '
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practical than tne dialectic: that which "we put in order,

on every proposed subject, to furnish conclusions extracted
from plausible reasons."

This methodical sense has lasted

or at least reappeared throughout the history of rhetoric:
it is, then, the art (knowledge organized with an eye to

teaching: dlsciplina) of finding arguments (Isidore), or

even: an ensemble of "quick and easy ways to find material
to discourse on subjects which are entirely unfcimiliar"

(Lamy)—-one can appreciate the philosophic misgivings
regarding such a method.

B.1.20. The Topic: a arid.

The second meaning is that of a network of forms, that

of a quasi-cybernetic circuit to which one submits the
material which one wants to transform into a persuasive

discourse.

One must resist things like this: a subject

(auaestio) is given to the orator; in order to find
arguments, the orator "runs" his subject through a grid of
empty forms: from the contact of the subject with each

compartment (each "place") on the grid (on the Topic) a
possible idea, an enthymematic premise, arises.

In

antiquity a pedagogical version of this process had existed:
the chrie (chreia). or "helpful" exercise, was a test of

virtuosity, given to students, which consisted of making
them pass through a series of places: guis?
quibus auxiliis?

cur?

quomodo?
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quando?

quid?

ubi?

Taking his

Irispiration from ancient topics > Lamy proposes the fo1lowing
grid in the seventeenth century: the genre, the difference,

the definitionv hhe enumeration,of parts, the etymoLogy, the

relationships (this is the associative range of the /root),
the comparison, the aversion, the effects, the canses, etc.
Let ns suppose that we have to prepare a discourse on
literature: we are "stumped" (for good reason), but

fortunately we have Lamy's topics: we may at least be able
to ask ourselves questions and attempt to answer them: to

what genre do we connect literature?

cultural production?
from other arts?
are they?

us?

art?

discourse?

If it is an art how is it different

How many parts are assigned to it and what

What does the etymology of the word suggest to

its connections with its morphological cousins

(literary. literal. letters, literate)?

literature have an aversion?

money?

to what does

the Truth?

etc.

The conjunction of the grid and the auaestio resembles that
of the theme and the predicates, the subject and its
attributes: the "attributive topic" has its apogee in the
tables of the Lu11ists (ars brevis):: the general attributes
are a kind of place.

One can see what the range of the

topical grid is: the metaphors that allude to the place

(topos) make it obvious enough to us: the arguments are
hidden. and are nestled in regions, depths, strata from

which one must ca11 them, awaken them: the Topic is the
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midwife of the latent: it is a fofm that articulates

■

contents and in this way produces fragments of meaning,
intelligible units.

B.1.21. The Topic: a reserve..

The places are principally empty forms; but these forms

have had a very strong tendency to be filled in the same

manner, to carry off contents, at first contingent, and then

repeated, reified.

The Topic has become a stockpile of

stereotypes, of established, time-honored themes, of

complete "pieces" which one uses almost obligatorily in the
treatment of each subject.

Hence the historical ambiguity

of fhp expressi on commonplaces (topoi koinoi. loci communi):
(1) they are empty forms, common to every argument (the less

they contain, the more common they are, see B.1.23. below);

(2) they are stereotypes, propositions used time and again.
The Topic, a full stockpile: its meaning is not in the least
that of Aristotle, but already that of the Sophists: they

had felt the necessity of having a catalog of things about
which one commonly speaks and on which one need not "get
stuck."

This reification of the Topic is systematically

pursued from Aristotle through the Latin authors; it had

triumphed in the neo-rhetoric and was absolutely standard in
the Middle Ages.

Curtius gave an inventory of these

indispensable themes accompanied by their fixed treatments.
Here are a few of these reified places (from the Middle

Ages): (1) topQS of affected raodestY: every orator must

declare that he is overwhelmed by his subject, that he is

incompetent, that there is assuredly no affectation in
Q 1

saying this, etc. (excusatio propter infirmitatem).

(2)

topos of the puer senilis: this is the magical theme of the

adolescent endowed with perfect wisdom or the old man

equipped with the beauty and grace of youth; (3) topos of
the locus ajnoenus: the ideal landscape; Elysium or Paradise

(trees, shrubbery, springs and meadows) has furnished a good
number of literary "descriptions" (see the ebphrasis. A.5.2.

above); but its origin is judiciary: every demonstrative
connection of a cause demands the araumentiam a loco: one

ought to base the proofs on the nature of the place wherethe action transpired; topography then invaded literature

(from Virgil to Barres); once reified, the topos has fixed
contents, independent of the context: olives and lions are
placed in Nordic regions: the landscape is detached from
Place■ because its function is to constitute a universal

sign—that of Nature: the landscape is the cultural sign of
Nature; (4) the advnaton (impossibilia) : the topos described
as roughly compatible with contrary phenomena, objects and
beings, this paradoxical conversion functions as the

disturbing sign of a world turned upside-down: the wolf
flees from the sheep (Virgil) ; this topos flourishes during

the Middle Ages, where it allows criticism of the epoch: it
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is the ■disagheeable old theme of "lldw I'ye seen; eyerything,"
or again: of "the last: straw. "

A31 of

these topoi, even

before the Middle Ages, are detachableypieceS (proof of

their strong reification) , mobile, transportable: they are
the elements of a combinatory syntagmatlc; their location

was ■ subject to only one limitation: they could not be put
into the Peroratio (peroration) , which is entirely
contingent, because it must summarize the oratio.
Nevertheless, from then on and even today, how many

stereotyped conclusions!

B.1. 22. Some Topics

';

, : 1 ■

Let us return to our Topic-grid, since it is that which
allows us to recapture our rhetoric tree, for which it is a

great distributing or dispatching place.

Antiquity and

classicism ■ have produced numerous topics, :defined by

affinitive grouping according to either,place or subject.
In the first case, one can cite the General Topic of Port-

Royal , inspired by the German logician Clauberg (165 4) ; the

topic of Lamy, which has already been cited and sketched
out: there are the grammatical places (etymology,
coniuaata) , logical places (genres, characteristics,

irregularities, specifications, differences, definitions,
divisions) , metaphysical places (final cause, efficient
cause, effeet, totality, parts, .opposing terms) ; this is
obviously an Aristotelian place.
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In the second case, that

of topics by subject, one can point to the following Topics:
(1) the oratorical Topic. properly speaking; in fact, it
comprises three topics: a rational topic, a moral
/

topic (ethe: practical intelligence, virtue, affection,
t

dedication), and a topic of passion (pathe: anger, love,

fear, shame and their contraries); (2) a topic of the

laughable, a part of a possible rhetoric of the comic;
Cicero and Quintilian have enirmerated some of the laughable

places: physical defects, spiritual defects, incidents,
appearances, etc.; (3) a theological topic: it includes the
different sources from which the theologians can derive

their arguments: Scriptures, Popes, Synods, etc.; (4) a
topic of the senses or topic of the imagination: one finds
it sketched out in Vico: "the founders of civilization [an

allusion to the anteriority of Poetry] engage in a topic of
the senses in which they combine the properties, the

qualities or the connections of individuals or species and
employ all of them concretely to form their poetric genre";

Vico speaks elsewhere of "universals of imagination"; in
this topic of the senses one can see the ancestor of

thematic criticism, that which proceeds by categories, not

by authors: that of Bachelard, in short: the soaring, the
cavernous, the torrential, the shimmering, the dormant,

etc., are the "places" to which one submits the "images" of
poetry.

B.1.23. The commonplaces.

The Topic strictly speaking (the oratorical,
Aristotelian topic), that which depends upon the pisteis
entechnoi. as opposed to the topic of characters and that of

passions, comprises two parts, two sub-topics: (1) a general

topic, that of commonplaces, (2) an applied topic, that of
special places.

The commonplaces (topoi koinoi. loci

communisimi) have a different sense for Aristotle than that

which we attribute to the expression (under the influence of

the third meaning of the word Topic. B.1.21).

The

commonplaces are not loaded stereotypes, but on the

contrary, precise places: being general (the general is
suited to the probable), they are common to all subjects.

For Aristotle, these commonplaces are, in all, only three in
number: (1) the possible/impossible: combined with time

(past, future), these terms produce a topic question: can

the thing have been done or not, could it be or not?

This

place can be applied to opposing relationships: if it is
possible for a thing to begin, it is possible for it to end,

etc. ; (2) existent/nonexistent (or real/not real); like the

preceding, the place can be compared with the time: if a
thing which is unlikely to occur has nonetheless occurred,

that which is more likely has certainly occurred (past);

building materials are assembled here: it is probable that
one will build a house here (future); (3) more/less: this is
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the place of magnitude and smallness; whcit triggers it is
the "all the more reason": there is a greater chance that X

may have hit his neighbors considering that he even hits his
own father.

Although by definition the commonplaces may be

without special features, each is best suited to one of the

three oratory genres: the possible/impossible is well suited
to the deliverative (is it possible to do this?), the
real/not real to the judiciary (has the crime taken place?),
the more/less to the epideictic (praise or blame).

B.1.24. The special Places.

/

The special places (eide. idia) are the places proper

to determined subjects; these are particular truths, special
propositions accepted by everyone; these are the

experimental truths attached to politics, to law, to
finance, to the sea, to war, etc.

However, since these

blend in with the practice of disciplines, genres,

particular subjects, one cannot enumerate them.
theoretical problem must nonetheless be posed.

The
The course

of our tree, then, comes to consist in comparing the

inventio. such as we know it up to here, and the speciality
of the content.

That comparison is the auaestio.

B.1.25. The thesis and the hvpothesis; causa.

The auaestio is the form of the discursive specialty.

Into all the operations ideally set by the rhetoric
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"machine/"one introduces a new variable (which is, to tell
the truth, wheh it is d matter of majcijig. the discourse, tj^g
variable of division): the content, the point of debate, in

short, the referential.

By definition contingent, this

referential can nonetheless be classified in two broad forms

which constitute the two major types of auaestio: (1) the
position or thesis (thesis. proPositum); this is a general
question, "abstract" as we would now say, but though
specified, referred (otherwise it would not bring the
special places into relief), yet without (and here is its ;
mark) any parameter of place or time (for example: is it
necessary to get married?); (2) the hypothesis (hypothesis):

this is a particular question, implying facts,
circumstances, persons, in short, a time and a place (for

example: must X get married?)—one sees that in rhetoric the
vords thesi s and hypothesis have a meaning completely
different from the one to which we are accustomed.

Now the

hypothesis, this temporalized and localized point of debate,
has another, former, great name: the hypothesis is the
causa.

Causa is a negotium. a concern, a combination of

various contingencies; a problematic point where the
contingent, and most particularly time, is engaged.

Just as

there are three "times" (past, present, future), one will

then have three types of causa, and each type will
correspond to one of the three oratory genres that we
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already know: so here they are, then, structurally grounded,
placed in our rhetoric tree.

One can give them the

following attributes:

B.1.26. Status causae.

Of these three genres, it is the judiciary which has
been commented upon most in antiquity; the rhetoric tree

extends beyond its neighbors.

The special places of the

judiciary are called the status causae.

The status causae

are the heart of the questio (whence the words: stasis .

status).

The status causae greatly excited the taxonomic

passion of antiquity.

The simplest classification

enumerates three status causae (it is always a matter of
forms which the contingent can take): (1) the conjecture:
has this taken place or not (an sit)?

This is the first

place because it is the immediate result of an initial
conflict of assertions: fecisti/non feci.: an fecerit?
you who did this/no.: it is not I: is it he?

is it

(2) the

definition (quid sit?) what is the legal definition of the
act, under what (juridical) name does it fall? is it a

crime? a sacrilege?

(3) the qualitv (quaie sit?): is the

act permitted, useful, excusable?

extenuating circumstances.

This is the order of

To these three places, one

occasionally adds a fourth place, the order of quibbling:
this is the state (status) of objection (the domain of the
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Genres

1.

2.

Audience

Object

Time

Reasoning (a)

future

exempla

DELIB

members

to advise/

useful/

ERATIVE

of an

to advise

harmful

assembly

against

Judges

JUDI
CIARY

3.

Adaptation

to accuse/

Just/

to defend

unjust

EPI-

spec

to praise/

beauti

DEIGTIG

tators,
public

to blame

ful/

ugly

Commonplaces

possible/
Impossible

past

enthymeme

real/not
real

present

exaggerated

more/less

comparison
(b)

lO

ro

(a)

This Is a question of a dominant characteristic.

(b)

This Is a variety of Induction, an exemplum oriented towards the

exaltation of the person praised (by Implicit comparisons).

Abrogation).

The status banciap^ gpi-

^ the orobati o is

exhausted; one proceeds from the theoretical elaboration of

discourse (rhetoric is a tecline, a speculative practice:) to
the discourse itself; one comes to the point where the

"machine" of the orator, of the egoy must link itself to the

machine of the adversarY, which, for its part, win have

made the same effort, done the same work. This linking,
this engagement of gears, is clearly cohfIietnair dt is the

disceptatio, the point of friction of the tv/o parties.
B.1.27. The subiective or moral Proofs, i

The entire probatio (the set of logical proofs, subject
to the firia1ity of conviction) having been examined, we must
return to the original dichotomy which opened the field of

the Inventio and go back to the subjective and moral proofs,
those "which depend:on emOtiOh:
psychological Rhetoric.

This is the province of

Uhdoubtedly two;names dominate it:

Plato (one must find types of discourse adapted to types of
souls) and Pascal (one must recover the interior movement of

the thought of the other). As for Aristotle, he fully
tecoghized a psychological rhetoric, but as he persisted in

making it depend on a techne. it is a "prpjected"
psychology: psychology such as everyone imagines it: not

"that which goes on in the head" of the publie, but what the
public believes goes on in other people's heads: this is an
endpxon, a verisimilar psychology, opposed to the "true"
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(dGiTioiistrat.ivG) syllogism.

Before Aristotle, teclinograplis

reconunended taking into accdiint psychological states such as

pity (compassion); but Aristotle dDroke new ground by
carefully classifying the passions, hot jaccording to

they are, but accordihg to what one believes them to be: he
did not describe them scientifically, but sought the

arguments that one could use in terms of ideas of the public
regarding the pasSiohsV

The passions are expressly

:

premises, placesn the rhetprical "psychology" of Aristotle
is a description of the eikos. of what is plausible
according to the passions. the psychological proofs are
divided into two broad groups: ethe (the characters, the

tones, the airs) and pathe (the passions, the sentiments,
■t-, , I'V:

the affects).

B. 1. 28 .

F.the . the characters . the tones .

Ethe are the attributes of the orator (and not those

.of the public, pathe) : these are the character traits that
the orator must display to tlie audience (his sincerity
matters little) to make a good impression: these are his
airs.

It is not, then a question of an expressive

psychology, but of an imaginary psychology (in the psycho
analytical sense ) : I must signify that which I want to be
for the other.

This is why—in the perspective of that

theatrical psychology—it is worth more to speak of tones
than of characters: tone: in the musical and ethical sense
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that the word has in Greek music.

Ethos:in the proper sense

is a connotation: the orator makes a statement and at the

same time he says: I am thiSy T am hot that.

For Aristotle,

there are three "airs,'V which together cdnstitute the

personal quality of the orator: ill ohrohesis: this is
the quality of those who deliberate well, those who weigh
the pros and cons well: it is an objective wisdom, a
displayed common sense; (2) arete: this is the show of a
candor which does not fear its consequences and expresses

itself with the help of direct purposes, impressions of a
theatrical honesty; (3) eunoia: this is a matter of not

shocking, not provoking, of being sympathetic (and perhaps
even: svmoa). of entering into an obliging complicity with

respect to the audience.

In short, while he speaks and

unfolds the protocol of logical proofs, the orator must
likewise say incessantly: follow me

(phronesis). admire me (arete) and love me (eunoia).
B.1.29.

Pathe. the sentiments.

|

Pathe are the affects of the one who listens (and not

of the orator), such, at least, as he imagines them.
Aristotle did not take them up in his account within the

perspective of a techne, that is, as protases of

argumentative chains: the distance which he marks with the
esto^^ (let us admit that) which precedes the description of

each passion and which, as we have seen, is the operator of
•
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the "plausible."

Each passion is picked out in its habitus

(the general dispositiphs which favor it), according to :its:
Object (for which one experiences it) and according to the
circumstances which give rise to the "crystallization"

(anger/composure, hatred/friendliness, fear/confidence,
desire/rivaIry, ingratitude/obiigingness, etc.).

We must

stress this, because this is the mark of Aristotle's
profound modernity, and in fact, the master dreamed of a

sociology of the so-called mass culture: all these passions
are intentionally taken in their banality: anger is what

everyone thinks of as anger, the passion[is; only what one
says of it: it is the pure intertextual, it is the
"citation": (this is the way Paolo and Francesca understood

it; they were in love with each other only for having read 
of Lancelot's loves).

Rhetorical psychology is therefore

completely contrary to a reductionist psychology, which
attempts to see what is behind what people say and which

:

claims to reduce the anger, for example, to another thing,

more deeply concealed.

For Aristotle, public opinion is the

first and ultimate given.

For him, there isn't any

hermeneutic (to be decoded) idea; for him, the passions are

fully developed pieces of language that the orator must

simply know well; hence the idea of a grid of passions, not
as a collection of essences but as a framework of opinions.

For the reductionist psychology (which prevails today).
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'Aristo11e subs11tutes (in advaince) a classifying psycboiogy,

which characterizes; languages." It itiay seem yery trite
(and no doubt untrue) to say that young pebple get angry

more easily than older pebple; but this platitude (and this
error) becomes interesting if we understand that such a

proposition is only one element in this general language of

other people which Aristotle reconstructs/perhaps according
to the mystery of Aristotelian philosophy: "universal

opinion is the measure of the being" (Nicomachean Ethics,
X.2.1173, a 1).

B.1.30. Semina probationum.
Thus ends the field or network of the Inventio. the

heuri Stic preparation of the materials of discourse.

We

must now tackle the Oratio itself: the ordering of its parts
(Dispositio) and its setting in words (Elocutio).

What are

the "programmatic" connections of the Inventio and the
Oratio?

Quintilian said it in a word (an image): he

recommends arranging the "germs of proof" (semina quae, dam
probationum sparaere) as early as the narratio (that is

before the argumentative part properly speaking).

From the

Inventio to the Oratio, then, there is a. swarm of
connections: one must scatter, then suppress, recapture,

; explode further.

In other words, the materials of the

Inventio are already pieces of language, set down in a state
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of reversibility, which one must now put into a fatally
irreversible order--that of discourse.

Hence the

f

second major operation of the techne; the Dispositio or
treatment of the constraints of succession.

B.2.

THE DISPOSITIO

We have seen that the position of the Dispositio
/

(taxis.) in the techne constitutes an important stake.
Without returning to the problem, one would define the

dispositio as the arrangement (either in the active sense,
operative, or in the passive sense, reified) of the major
parts of discourse.

The best translation is perhaps:

composition. bearing in mind that the compositio in Latin is

something else: it refers uniquely to the arrangement of
words within the phrase; as for the conlocatio. it

designates the distribution of material within each part.
According to an incremental syntagmatic, one has, then: the
structure of the phrase (compositio), the structure of the
part (conlocatio). the structure of the discourse

(dispositio).

The major parts of discourse were set down

quite early by Corax (A.1.2), and their distribution has
hardly varied since then.

Quintilian named five parts (he

split the third part into confirmatio and refutatio),
Aristotle four: it is this division that we will adopt here.

B.2.1.

The egressio.
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Before enumerating these fixed parts, we must draw

attention to the optional existence of a movable part: the
eqressio or digressio: it is a display piece, off the

subject or connected to it by a very loose thread, and its
function is to make the drator shine; more often than not,

it is a eulogy to places or men (for example), the eulogy to

Sicily in Cicero's Verres).

This movable unit, beyond

classification and, as it were, fluttering about—the origin
of the ekphrasis in neo-rhetoric—is a vehicle for the
spectacular, a sort of hallmark. Of the signature of the

"sovereign language" (the kurosis of Gorgias, the "poetics"

of Jakobson).

However, just as a painting is always sighed

in the same place, so likewise the ddgressio ends by taking
its. place fairly regularly between the narratio and the
confirmatio.

B.2..2

The paradigmatic structure of the four parts.

The Dispositio proceeds from a dichotomy which was
previously, in other terms, that of the Inventio: animos

impeilere (to excite)/rem docere (to inform, to convince).
The first term (the;appeal to the sentiments) covers the

exordium and :the epilogue. in other words, the two extreme
parts of the discourse.

The second term (the appeal to

facts, to reason) covers the.narratio (relationship of
facts) and the confirmatio (establishment, of proofs or means

of persuasion), in other words, the two median parts of the
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discourse.

The syntagmatic order, therefore, does not

follow the paradigmatic order, and we are dealing with a
chiastic construction: two sections pertaining to the

"passions" frame a demonstrative block:
demonstrative
12
narratio

1

3
confirmatio

4

exordium

epilogue
emoti onal

We will treat the four parts according to the

paradigmatic order: exordium/epilogue, narration/
confirmation.

B.2.3.

The beginning and the end.

The solemnization of beginnings and endings, of
inaugurations and conclusions, is a problem which transcends

rhetoric (rites, ceremonies, liturgies).

The opposition of

the exordium and the epilogue, under well-organized forms,
is no doubt somewhat archaic; also, in developing itself, in
seculari zing itself, the rhetorical code has been induced to
allow discourse without exordium (in the deliberative

genre), according to the rule in medias res. and even to

advise abrupt endings (Isocrates for example).

In its

canonical form, the opposition beoinnina/end allows for an

unevenness: in the exordium, the orator must engage himself
with prudence, reserve, moderation; in the epilogue, he no

100

rpriger. has to. control ;hirnself,>h

himself with 1

depth, he puts into play all the resources of a great,
toUchihg performance [ieu1.
B.2.4.

1

1

The proem.

V In archaic poetry, that of: the aedes,

the prodimon

(proem) is that which preceded the song [chant] (oime): it

is the prelude of the lyre pl%ers; who
competition Fconcoursel . loosen their fingers and thereby

take advantage:of the Qpp;ortunify to gaf^^ favor; with ithe :
jury in advance:(there are vestiges of this in Wagneris Die
Meistersinoer). ; The oime is an oId epic bailad: the
narrator would begin to tell the story from a tota]ly
arbitrary moment: he would just as well have been abie to

"catch" it earlier or later (the story is "infinite"); the
wofdiS cut the potential thread of a narrative without

origin.

This arbitrariness of the beginning was marked by

the words ex ou (from what); I begin from here! i-Ue aede of ^

the Odyssey asks the Muse to sing of U3ysses' return from

v/hatever moment it pleases her

" The function of the proem

is thus, in a way, to exorcize the arbitrariness of the very
beginning.

Why begin with this rather than that? 7 Why cut: ;

in with the speech that Ponge (the author of the Proems)
calls the analogical, unrefined magma?

What is necessary at

this knife edge is a softening, at this anarchy a formal
decision: this is the Prooimon.

,.

t'7':

7

'•
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Its apparent role is to
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tame, as if beginning to speak, encountering language, were
risking the unknown, the scandal, the monster.

In each of

us there is a terrifying solemnity in "breaking" silence
(the other language)—except among certain blabbermouths who

fling themselves into speech like Gribouille and "grab" it
by force, no matter where: it is this which we will call

"spontaneity."

Such perhaps is the base from which the

exordium of rhetoric, the regulated inauguration of
discourse, proceeds.

B.2.5.

The exordium.

Canonically, the exordium comprises two moments—I. The

captatio benevolentiae, or the enterprise of the seduction

of the listener, which is a matter of Immediately gaining
his good will by a proof of complicity.

The captatio was

one of the most stable elements of the rhetorical system (it

is already flourishing in the Middle Ages and remains the
same into our own time); it follows a very elaborate model
coded according to the classification of cases: the means of

seduction varies depending upon the connection between the

case and the doxa, or current standard of opinion: (a) if
the case is identified with the doxa. it is a matter of a
"natural" case, of good form, it is of no use to submit the

judge to each seduction, each pressure; this is the genre of
the endoxon, the honestum: (b) if the case is in some way
neutral with regard to the doxa. a positive action is
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necessary to vancjuish the inertia of the judgOy^ t

his curiosity, to make him attentive (attentum); this is the
genre of the adoxon. the humile• (c V if the case is

ambiguous, for oxampre if two dox^ enter into conflict, it
is necessary to obtai n the favor of the judge, to make him
benevolum, to make him lean to one side; this is the genre
of the■ amphidoxoh. the dubium r (d1 if the case is

complicated, : obscure, it is necessary to lead the jucige to
follow you as he would a guide, a scout, to make him

docilem, receptive, malleable; this is the genre of
dysparakoloutheton, the obscurum: {3) finally, if the case

is extraordinary, if it arouses astonishment in situating
itself very far from the dpxa (for example: pleading against
a father, an old man, a child, a biind man, going against
the human touch) , a vague action (of connotatidn) toward the

judge is no longer sufficient, a true remedy is necessary,
but it must nonetheless be an indirect remedy, because it is
not necessary to offend or overtly shock the judge: this is

the insinuatio. an autonomous fragment (and no longer a
simple tone) which places itself after the beginning.

For

example: pretending to be impressed by the adversary.

Such

are the modes of the captitio benevolentiae.

II. The

partitio, the second stage of the exordium, announces the

divisions that one comes to adopt, the plan that one comes
to follow (one can multiply the partitiones bv putting one
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at the beginning of each part); the advantage, says

Quintilian, is that once one has the ending, the story never
seems too long.

B.2.6.

The epilogue.

How to tell when a discourse is finished?

as arbitrary as the beginning.

This is also

A sign of the end, of the

closure, is therefore necessary (so in certain manuscripts:
ci fait qeste que Turoldus declinet).

This sign was

rationalized under the alibi of pleasure (that which shows
the degree to which the ancients would be conscious of the

"ennui" of their discourse!).

Aristotle indicated it, not

in connection with the epilogue, but in connection v;ith the

periodic sentence: the sentence is a "pleasing" phrase,
because it is the opposite of that which is unfinished.

It

is unpleasant, on the other hand, not to know what's coming,
not to see the end of something.

The epilogue (peroratio.

conclusio. cumulus, climax) allows for two levels: (1) the
level of "things" (posita in rebus): this is a matter of

recapitulating and summing up (enumeratio. rerum repetitio):
(2) the level of "sentiments" (posita in affectibus): this

moving, maudlin conclusion was little used in Greece, where
an usher would impose silence upon an orator who went too
far or tugged at the heartstrings for too long; but in Rome,

the epilogue was the occasion for great theatrics, for the
advocate's gesture: revealing the accused surrounded by his
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parents and children, producing a blood-stained dagger,
bones pulled from the wound.

Quintilian examined all these

special effects.

B.2.7.

The narratio.

The narratio (dienesis) is of course the narration of

the facts involved in the case (since causa is the auaestio

in that which is penetrated by the contingent), but this

narration is conceived uniquely from the point of view of
the proof, it is "the persuasive exposition of some fact or
alleged fact."

The narration, then, is not a narrative (in

the romantic sense and as detached from the term), but an
argumentative protasis.

Consequently, it has two inevitable

characteristics: (1) its nakedness: no digression, no
prosopopoeia, no direct argumentation: there is no
'

techne appropriate to the narratio: it must only be clear.

credible. brief: (2) its functionalism: it is a preparation
for the argumentation; the best preparation is that in which
the meaning is hidden, in which the proofs are disseminated
in imperceptible seeds (semina probationum).

The narratio

includes two types of elements: the facts and the
descriptions.

B.2.8.

Ordo naturalis/ordo artificialis.

In classical rhetoric the exposition of facts is

subject to a single structural rule: that the connections be
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plausiblev

But much later, during the Middle Ages, when

Rhetoric was completely detached from the judiciary, the
narrati o became an autonomous genre and the arrangement of

its parts (ordo) became a theoretical problem: this is the

opposition pf the ordo naturalis and the ordo artificialis.

I'All order," says a contemporairy of AlGhin, "is either
natural or artificial.

The order is natural if one can

recount the facts in the same order as they occurred: the

order is artificial if one starts not from the beginning of
what has happened, but in the middle."
of the flashback.

This is the problem

The ordo artificialis forces a violent

cutting up of the sequence of facts, since it relies on ■
movable, reversible units; it implies or produces a distinct
particular, boldly displayed, since it destroys the

(mythical) "nature" of linear time.

The opposition of the

two "orders" rests not on the facts but on the parts of

discourse themselves: the ordo naturalis. therefore, is tliat

which respects the traditional norm (exordiUiti. narratio.

confirmatio. epilogue), the ordo artificialis is that which
upsets that order according to circumstances; paradoxically,
(and this paradox is no doubt frequent), naturalis therefore
means cultural, and artificialis means spontaneous,
continaent. natural.

B.2.9.

The descriptions.
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Beside the strictly Ghronological---or diachronic, or

diegetic--aj<iis, the narratio permits an axis of aspect or _
duration, formed by a flowing sequence of states: the

descriPtions.

These descriptions wefe - strongly coded.,

There were primarily: the topographies. or descriptions of

place: the Chronographies. or descriptions of time, periods,
ages; the prosopographies. or portraits.

We know the fate

of these "pieces" in our literature, outside of the

judiciary.

After all, in order to finish the narratio. one

must point out that discourse can at times allow for a
second narration: the first having been very brief, one

takes it up again in detail, ("Here is how, in detail, what
I have come to say happened"): this is the epidiegesis. the
repetita narratio.

B.2.10. The confirmatio.

From the narratio. or account of the facts, follows the

confirmatio. or account of the arguments: it is there that

the "proofs" elaborated in the course of the inventio are
stated.

The confirmatio (apodeixis) can include three

elements: (1) the propositio (prothesis): this is a

definition brought in for the case, for the point of debate;
it can be simple or complex depending on the charges.
("Socrates was accused of corrupting the youth and

introducing new superstitions"); (2) the argumentatio. which
is the account of convincing evidence; no particular

V
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structure is recommenaeca: except

must,:begin wltb: : ■

strong evidence, continue with weak proofs and end with very
strong proofs; (3) at times, at the end of the confirmdtin D

the: sustained discourse loratio continnar ic -■ r.^^t-rurtcd: by
a very .lively dialogue with the opposing advocate or a

witness: the other interrupts tJ^e monbiogue* this is the

"

aitercatio. This oratbry episode was unknown to the Greeks;
It as connected with the genre of the Rogatib. or arrnc;;,:i-rvr-y
interrogfation (Ouousque tandem . Cati iirrp

:

B.2.11. Other slices of discourse

The very strong coding of the Disposif.in (of which a

deep furrow remains in the pedagogy; of the "plan") ; amply ■
attests that humanism, in its thinking on language, is
greatly concerned with the problem of syntagmatic units. : : '

The Dispositio is one slice among others.

Here are some of

these slices, starting with the largest units: I, The

discourse as a whole can form a unit, if one opposes it to
other discourses; this is the case of classification by
genres or by styles; this is also the case of figures of

subiect, the fourth type of figures after the tropes, the
figures of speech and the figures of thought: the figures of

subiect seized all of the oratio; Dionysius of Halicarnassus

distinguished three of them: (i) the direct (say what you
mean to say) , (2) the oblique (circuitous discourse: Bossuet

advising the king, under the pretext, of religion) , (3) the

contrary (antiphrasis, irony); II. the parts of the

Dispositio (we know what tliey are); III. the piece, the
fragment. the ekphrasis or descriptio (we know this as

well); IV. i

the atriculus is a dev^lpping

unit: in a comprehensive work, a colicction of Disputationes

or Summa. one gives a suiranary of the disputed question
;(introduced bv utrum); V> the periodic sentence is a
sentence structured according to an organic model (with a
beginning and an end); it has no less than two members
(elevation: and abasement. tasis and apotasis) and no more

than four

Immediately under (and truly, from tlie periodic

sentence on) begins the sentence, the object of the '
compositio. the technical operation whicli calls fortli the
Elocutio.

■ THE ELOCUTIO )■ 'i-

B.3.i

The arguments having been found and divided into the

parts of discourse by large blocks, it remains to "put them

into words": this is the function of that third part of the
techne rhetorike which is called 1exis or:e1ocutio. to

which one has the habit of abusively reducing rhetoric,
because of the interest given in modern times to tlie figures

of rhetoric, a part (but only part) of the Elocutio.

B.3.1.

The evolution of the Elocutio.
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In effect, the elocutio has evolved greatly since the

origin of RUfetoric.

Absent from COf^

s classificationsi,;ft

made its appearance when Gorgias.decided to apply aestbetic
criteria (coming frdmiRoetry) to prpse| Aristdtle dealt with
it less' fnlly, than :tbe;:rest, of rhetoric

it^ dpyeloped ■

chiefly with the Romans (Cicero, Quintilian), it blossomed
into spirituality with Dionysius of Ralicarnassus and the

anonymous author of Peri Hvpsous and ended by absorbing all
of Rhetoric, identified under the single species of the

"figures."

However, in its canonical state, the elocutio

defines a field which bears upon all language: it includes
at one and the same time our grammar (up to the heart of the

Middle Ages) and that which we call diction. the theater of
the voice.

The best translation for elocutio is perhaps not

elocution (which is too limited), but enunciation, or if
need be locution (locutory activity). , . ,

•R:i ■ 7 ■

-The network.

.

The internal classifications of the elocutio were

numerous undoubtedly for two reasons: first because this

techne had to pass through different idioms (Greek, Latin,
the Romance languages) by v/hich each of them could bend the
nature of the "figures"; next because the increasing

promotion of that part of rhetoric was subject to

terminological reinventions (made obvious by the delirious
naming of figures).

Here we will simplify this network.

The matrix opposition is that of the paradigniatic and the

syntagmatiG: (1) choose the words (electlp, eclogue), (2)
assembTe them (synthesis:, compositi o).

B.3.3

The "colors."

The electio implies that one can substitute one term in

the lahguage for another: the eJLeGt_ijp is possible because
synonymy is part of the system of language (Quintilian).

The speaker Tlocuteurl can substitute one signifier for
another a:nd he can even produce a second meaning
(connotaton) in that substitution.

All kinds of

substitutions, some of them being the volume and the.manner,
are of the Tropes ("conversions"), but the meaning of the

word is ordinarily restricted so that it can be opposed to
the "Figures."

The truly general terms which

^^'S.iscrimin.ately tnke in all classes of substitutions are

"ornaments" and "colors." By their own connotations, these
two words demon$trate well how the ancients conceived of

language: (1) there is a naked base, a natural level, a
normal state of communication, starting from which one can

elaborate a very complicated, ornate expression, marked by a
greater or lesser distance with regard to the original
ground level.

This postulate is decisive, because it seems

that even today it determines all attempts to revitalize

rhetoric.

Recovering rhetoric: this is fatally believing in

the existence of a gap between two states of language;
r

'Ill

conversely, condemning rhetoric is always done in the name

of a denial of the hierarchy of languages, among which one

admits only of a "fluctuating hierarchy" and not a fixed
one, founded in nature; (2) the second layer (rhetoric) has

a function of animation: the "natural" state of language is
inert, the second state is "lively": colors, lights, flowers
(COlores > lumina. flores); the ornaments tend toward the

feelings, the body; they make speech pleasurable; there is a
venustas of language (Cicero); (3) at times the colors are :

used "to spare modesty the difficulty of a statement which

is too naked," Quintilian); to put it another way, as a
possible euphemism, the "color" indexes a taboo, that.of the
"nudity" of the language: like the rouge which tints the
face, color exposes the desire to hide the object(this is
the same dialectic as clothing (schema means costume. figura
appearance).

B.3.4.

The taxonomic rage.

That which we call by the generic term the figures Qf

rhetoricj in all historical rigor and for the purpose of
avoiding the ambiguity between the Tropes and the Figures.

it would be better to call ornaments.

Throughout the

centuries they were and still are today the object of a
veritable taxonomic rage, indifferent to the mockery which
very soon sprang up nonetheless.

It.seems that one can dp

nothing with these figures of rhetoric other than name them
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and classify them: from certain terms, to either very banal
forms (epithet. reticence) of very barbaric forms
(anantapodoton. epanadiplose. taoinose. etc.) to dozens of

groupings.

Why this fury for cuttirig apart, for name-

giving, this sort of intoxicated activity by the language on
the language?

Undoubtedly (this is at least a structural

explication) because rhetoric tries to codify speech (and

^ ^

not just language either), that is to say the very space
where, in principal, the code stops.

Saussure encountered

this problem: what to make pt the stable combinations of

words, of the fixed syntagms which partake of language and
speech, of structure and combination at the same time?

It

is to this extent that Rhetoric prefigured a linguistics of

speech (other than statistics), a contradiction in terms,
that which lost its breath trying to keep the "manners of
speech" within a more and more Gomplex network, wanting to
control the uncontrollablei: the mirage itself.

B.3.5.

Classification Of ornaments.

All these ornaments (hundreds of them) have been

divided for al] time according to several binary groups: ,
tropes/fiqures . grammatical tropes/rhetorical tropes.

figures of grammar/figures of rhetoric, figures of speech/

figures of thought, tropes, figures of diction.

From one

author to another, the classifications are contradictory:
here the tropes are opposed to the figures. there they form
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part of them; for Lamy hyperbole is a trope, for Cicero it

is a figure of thought, etc.

A word on the three most

frequent oppositions: I. Tropes/Figures.

This is/the most

ancient of the distinctions, that of antiquity; in the
Trope, the conversion of meaning turns on a unity, on a word

(for example. catachresis: the wing of a windmill, the arm
of a chair), in the Figure, the conversion requires several
words, all together a little syntagm (for example, the

periphrasis: the comforts of conversation).

This opposition

would correspond roughly with that of the system and the

syntagm.

II. Grammar/Rhetoric.

The grammatical tropes are

conversions of meaning that have passed into current usage
to the extent that one no longer "senses" the ornament:

electricity (a metonym for electric light), a cheerful house

(a trivialized metaphor), even when the rhetorical tropes
are felt to be extraordinary: nature's wash, for the Flood
(Tertullian), the show of the kevboard. etc.

This

opposition would correspond roughly to that of denotation .
and connotation.

III. Speech/Thought.

The opposition of

figures of speech and figures of thought is the most common;
figures of speech exist where the figure would disappear if
one were to change the words (such as the anacoluthon, which

is contained only in the order of the words: The nose of
Cleopatra, if it had been shorter, the face of the world . .

.); the figures of thought always subsist, whatever words

11.4

one decides to use (such as the antithesis: I am the wound

and the knife, etc.); this third opposition is mentalistic;

it brings together the signifieds and the signifiers, the
one being able to exist without the other.

It is still

possible to conceive of new classes of figures, and indeed
one can assert that any one engaged in rhetoric would be

tempted to classify the figures in his turn and in his way.
However, we are still lacking (but perhaps it is important
to produce) a purely operative classification of the

principal figures: the dictionaries of rhetoric in effect

allow us to know easily what a chleuasmus. an epanalepsis, a.

paralipsis is, to look up the often very obscure name, for
example; but no book permits us to take an inverse path, to
get from the sentence (found in a text) to the name of the

figure; if I read "so much marble trembling over so much
shadow," what book win tell me that this is a hvpallaae if
I don't already know it?

We lack an inductive instrument

useful for analyzing classical texts according to their own
meta-langauge.

B.3.6.

Recalling some figures.

There is clearly no need to furnish a list of the

"ornaments" recognized by ancient rhetoric under the general
name of "figures": there are dictionaries of rhetoric.

Nonetheless I think it useful to recall the definition of
ten or so figures taken at random so as to give a concrete
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perspective to these few remarks on the electio.

l.

Alliteration is a closeiy related repetition of consonants
in a short svntaam (Le zele de Lazare); when the tones are
repeated, it is apophonia (II pleure dans mon coeur comme il

pleut sur la ville).-^-'

It has been suggested that

alliteration is often less intentional than critics and
stylists tend to believe: Skinner has shown that in
Shakespeare's sonnets a]literation does not exceed what one

can expect in a normal frequency of letters and groups of
letters.

(2) Anacoluthon is an occasionally faulty rupture

in construction (Beyond the sight of a great, well-ordered
army, the Macedonians, were astonished when . . .).

(3)

Catechresis takes place when language, having no "proper"
term at its disposal, one must use a "figure" (the wings of

a windmill).

(4) Ellipsis consists of omitting syntactic

elements up to the point where Intelligibility can be
affected (I loved vou fickle, what would I have done

faithful?); ellipsis was often reputed to represent a
"natural" state of language: this would be the "normal" mode

of speech in pronunciation, in syntax, in the dream, in
children's language.

(5)

Hyperbole consists of

exaggerating: either in augmentation (auxesis; to go faster

than the wind), or in diminution (tapinose; slower than a

tortoise).

(6) Ironv or Antiphrasis, consists of implying

something other than what one says (this is a connotation);
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as F. de Neufchateau says: "There is a tenderness in the
words she chooses/but another meaning in the tone she uses."

(7) Pheriphrasis arises from a detour of language that one

makes to avoid a taboo expression.

If the periphrasis is

understated, one calls it perissoloav.

(8) Reticence or

aposiopesis marks an interruption of discourse due to an
abrupt change in feeling (the Virgilian Ouos eao).

(9)

Suspension delays the text, by adding incidental clauses
before the resolution: this is a suspense at the level of
the sentence.

B.3.7.

The Literal and the Figurative.

As we have seen, the entire structure of the "figures"

rests upon the idea that there are two languages, one

literal and one figurative, and that consequently. Rhetoric,
in its elocutionary part, is a table of the deviations of
language.

From antiquity on, the meta-rhetorical

expressions which attest to this belief are innumrable: in

the elocutio (the field of figures), the words are
"transported." "diverted." "removed" from their normal,
familiar environment.

Aristotle sees in this a taste for

disorientation: one must "keep a distance from common
expressions . . . : ih this respect, we experience the same

impressions as in thejpresence of strangers: style must be
given a foreign air, liecause what comes from afar excites

admiration."

There is accordingly a relationship of
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strangeness between the "current words," which we^all use

(but who is the "we"?), and the "distinctive (strange)

words" in daily usage: "barbarisms" (the words of strange
people), neologisms, metaphors, etc.

For Aristotle, a

mixture of the two terminologies is necessary, for if one
makes use only of current words, one produces a vulgar

discourse, and if one makes use only of distinctive words,
one has an enigmatic discourse.

From the domestic/foreign

and the normal/strange. the opposition has slid to the

literal/figurative.

What is the literal meaning?

"It is

the initial meaning of the word." (Du Marsais): "When the

word signifies that for which it was originally
established."

However, the literal meaning does not have to

be the most ancient (the archaism is disorienting), but the
meaning immediately prior to the creation of the figure: the
literal, the true, once again, the preceding (the Father).
In classical Rhetoric, the preceding found itself

neutralized.

Hence the paradox: how can the literal meaning

be the "natural" meaning and the figurative the "original"
meaning?

B.3.8.

The function and origin of the Figures.

One can distinguish two groups of explications here.

Explications by function: (a) the second language arises
from the necessity to euphemize, to circumvent taboos; (b)
the second language is a technique of illusion (in the same
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sense as a painting:, perspective, shading, visual

deception); it redistributes things, facts appear different

from what they are or as they are but more impressive; (c)
there is an inherent pleasure in the association of ideas
(we say: a ludic pleasure). II. Explications bv oriain;

these explications begin from the postulate that the figures
exist "in nature

that is, in the "people" (Racine: "One

only has to listen to a dispute betv/een two lower-class

women: what a wealth of figures!

They squander metonymy,

catachresis, hyperbole, etc."); and F. de Neufchateau: "In

the city, at the court, in the fields, at the mart,
figures exhale the eloquence of the heart."

The

How then to

reconcile the "natural" origin of the figures with their
secondary, posterior position in the structure of language?

The classical response is that the art chooses the figures
(in accordance v;ith an accurate assessment of their

/',

distance, which must be measured). it does not create them;
in short, the figurative is an artificial combination of
natural elements. '

Vico and poetrv.

In leaving this last hypothesis (the figures have a

"natural" origin), we can distinguish two more types of
explication.

The first is m.ythical, romantic, in the

broadest sense of the term: "literal" language is poor; it
does not satisfy all needs, but it is siipplemented by the

'.'v:
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irruption of anotlier language, "tlie divine blossoming of the
spirit which the Greeks called Tropes," (Hugo); or again

,v;

(Vlco according to Micheiet), Hoetry being the originai
language, the four great archetypal figures were invented in

the course of nature. not by writers, but by humanity in its

poetic age; Metaplior. then Metonvmv. then Synecdoche, then
Irony; originally they were employed naturally.

How then

could they have become the "figures of rhetoric"?

Vico

gives a highly structural response: when abstraction was
born, that is to say when the "figure" found itself caught

in a paradigmatic opposition with another language.
B.3.10♦

The language of

the passions.

The second explication is psychological: it is that of

Lamy and the classicists: the figures are the language of

the passions.

The passions distort one's point of view on

things and require peculiar words: "If men conceived all

things which occur to their spirit simply, as they are in
themselves, they would speak of them all in the same manner:
geometers all speak the same language"

(Lamy) .

This is an

interesting viewpoint, for if the figures are the
"morphemes" of the passions, we can tell through the figures

what the classical taxonomy of the passions is, especially
the amorous passions from Racine to Proust.

For example,

the exclamation corresponds to the sudden abduction of
speech, to emotional aphasia; the doubt. the dubitation (the

name of a figure) corresponds to the torment of uncertainty
of conduct (What to do? this? that?), to the difficulty of

reading the pther person's "sighs't the ellipsis corresponds
to the censure of everything that generates passion; the

paralipsis (to say tliat one is not going to say what one

finally ends up saying) correspohds to the -resumption of the
"scene

the spir1 to:offend; repetition corresponds to the

obsessive preoccupation with "good reasons"; hvpotvposis

'

corresponds to the scene which one imagines vividly, to the

inner fantasy, to the mental scenario (desire, jealousy),
etc.

One therefore understands better hov; the figurative

can be a language which is at the same time natural and

secondary; it is natural because the passions are natural;
it is secondary because morality demands that these same

passions, aIthough "hatural," be kept at a distance, placed
in the region of the Fault; it is because, for the
classicist, "nature" is bad, the figures of rhetoric are at
the same time both justified and suspect.

B.3.11. The compositio.

We must now return to the primary opposition, that

which serves as the origin of the network of the Elocutio: V
the compositid . the associative field of words in the
sentence, stands opposed to the electio, the substitutive

field of ornaiments.

We will not take sides here on the

linguistic definition of the "sentence": for us it is merely
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that unit of disGourse which is intermediate between the

pars orationis (the major part of the oratio) and the fiaura
(a small groups of words)

Rhetoric cbdified,two

types of "construction": (iV a; tgeometxlc":construction: :
that of the periodic Sentence (Aristotle): "a sentence

having in itself a beginning, an end, an a range that one
could easily grasp"; the structure of the sentence depends
on an internal system of commas (individua1 characters) and

colons (sections); the number of them is variable and open

to dispute; in general, one needs 3 or 4 colons, subject to
opposition (1/3 or 1-2/3-4); the frame of reference of this

system is organic (the in-and-out motion of breathing) or
sportive (the sentence reproduces the ellipsis of the
stadium: a journey out, a curve, a trip back); (2) a
"dynamic" construction (Dionysius of Halicarnassus): in this
case the sentence is conceived as a sublimated periodic

sentence, animated, transcended by "movement"; it is no
longer a matter of a trip out and a trip back, but of an
ascent and a descent; this sort of "swing" is more important
than the choice of words: it depends on a sort of innate
sense of the writer.

This "movement" has three modes: (1)

brutal, hard-edged (Pindar, Thucydides), (2) smooth.
encased, lubricated (Sappho, Isocrates, Cicero), (3) mixed.
the reserve of undecided cases.

Thus ends the rhetorical network—since we have
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decideel to leave out those parts of the techne rhetorike
which are strictly theatrical, hysterical, bound to the
voice: actio and memoria.

The slightest historical

conclusion would exceed the purely didactic intention of

this simple handbook (moreover, there would be some ironv in
my constructing a second meta-languaae. which we have iust
used for a peroration which originates from the first meta
language).

However, in taking leave of ancient Rhetoric. I

would like to sav what endures for me personally of this
memorable yoyage (the descent in time, the descent into the
network, as of a double riyer).

"What endures for me"

means; the questions that come to me from that ancient

empire in my present work, and which, haying once approached
Rhetoric. I am no longer able to evade.

First the conviction that many features of our

literature, our education, our institutions of language (and
is there a single institution without language?) would be
clarified or understood differently if we thoroughly knew
(that is to say, if we would not censure) the rhetorical
code which gave its language to our culture; neither a

technique, nor an aesthetic, nor a morality of Rhetoric is
any longer possible, but a history?

Yes, a history of

Rhetoric (as research, as book, as education). extended by a
new way of thinking (linguistics, semiology. historical
science, psychoanalysis. Marxism), is necessary today.
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Next this idea that there is a sort of obstinate
agreement between Aristotle (from whom rhetoric Qriainates)
and the so-called mass culture, as if Aristoteliahism. dead

since the Renaissance as philosophy and as logic, dead as an
aesthetics since Romanticism, has survived in a degraded.
diffuse, inarticulate state in the cultural experience of
Occidental societies—an experience founded through
democracy on an ideology of "the greatest number." the

majority rule, the current opinion: all this indicates that
a sort of Aristotelian vulgate still defines a type of
trans-historic Occident, a ciyilization (our own) which is

that of the endoxa: how does one avoid the evidence that
Aristotle (poetics, logic. rhetoric) furnishes a complete.
analytic grid for all language—narrative, discursive.

argumentatiye--which is conveyed bv "mass communication." a
complete analytic grid (from the notion of "verisimilitude")
and that he represents this optimal homogeneity of a meta

language and a language-object which can define an applied
science?

In a democratic regime. Aristotelianism would

therefore be the best of cultural sociologies.

„ Finally, this statement, rather troubling in its
brevity, that all our literature, formed bv Rhetoric and

sublimated bv Humanism, has issued from a politico-judicial
practice (unless we hold to the mistaken view which limits
Rhetoric to the "figures"): in that arena where the most
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brutal conflicts—of money, property, social class—are
taken up. contained, domesticated, and maintained bv the
power of the State; wbere the institution regulates feigned

speech and codifies all recourse tO:what is significant: it

is there where our literature is born.

This is why to let

Rhetoric fall to the level of a fully and simply historical

obnect

to claim, in the name of the text^ of writing a new

application of language—and never to cut oneself off from
revoluntionarv knowledge—these are one and the same
pursuit■

Roland Barthes

Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Paris

125

NOTES;\

^ Roland Barthes,;

rancienne

m^moire," Conmiuni cations 16 (1970): 172-229.

aide:

^ Ernst R. Curtiu;;, La 11tt^rature eiirop^ene et la
nvoven ^ge latin. trans. J. Br^joux (Paris: PUF; 1956).
First German ed. 1948.

European Literature arid the Lati n

Middle Ages, trans. Wiliard R. Trask (Princeton: princeton
UP, 1953). Charies S. Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic
Tnterpreted from RepresentativeV Works (Gionrpc;t-Pr ^ Macc . :
(Peter Smith, 1959). First edV , 1924. Medieval Rhetori c Anri
Poetic (to 1400) Interpreted from Representative Works

(Gloucester, Mass. V Pet^r; Smith; 1959).:(F

ed;, 1928.

Rend^Bray. La formation de la doctrine classiaue en France

^

(Paris: Nizet,; 1951); Ferdinand Brunot, Historie de la
lanque francaise (Paris, 1923). ;Henri MOrier, Pictidnaira

de dodtiaue et de!thdtoriaue (Paris1'pUf; 1961),

_ ^ There ape nhmerous obscene jokes on the dasus and
coniunctio (which are in fact grammatical terms) of which

this drawn out irtetaphor^
from A Thousand and One
Nights can give an idea: "He used the preposition in the
correct construction and joined the subordinate clause v/ith

the conjunction, but his spouse fell like the nominal ending
before the genetive." More nobly, Alain de Lille explains
that humanity commits barbarisms in the union of the sexes,
the metaplasms (abuses) which infringe upon the rules of
Venus; man falls into the anastrophes (inversions of

construction); in his folly, he goes as far as the

tmesis (Curtius, 512-513); likewi se Calderdn commenting
upon the situation of a woman spied upon while she goes to
see her lover, "It is a great barbarism of love to go to see
and be seen, because, 1ike a bad grammarian, it make a
passive person out of an active person." One knows in which
anatomical sense P. Klossovski revived the terms of the
scholastic (untrumsit. sed contra. vacuum. auidest• "the

quidest of the inspectress").

It goes without saying that

the collusion between grammar (or rhetoric or scholastics)

and the erotic is not only "funny"; it ■ traces with precision

and, gravity a transgressive place where two taboos are
raised: that of language and that of sex.

^ T.N. Annette Lavers in Roland Barthes: Structuralism
and After, attributes the term "monumental history" to
Nietzsche (35-36).

Atticism: this ethnocentrism is evidently connected
to that which one could call the racism of class: one must
not forget that the "classical" expression ("classicism")
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has as its origin the opposition proposed by Aulus Gellius '
(second century) between the author classicus and the
proletarius: the allusion to tlie constitution of Servias

Tulliuis who divided citizerts according to their wealth into
five classes, the first of which formed the classici (the
proletarii was beyond class); therefore classiaue means


etymological]y: that which pertains to the social "upper
crust" (wealth and power).

® T.N. Robert lists an "acroamatique: an oral lesson,
the teaching of Aristotle," vol. 1, 44. There is no similar
listing in the Oxford English Dictionarv.

^ There was a mnemonic list of the seven arts: Gram
(matica) loquitur. : Dia(lectica) vera docet.

Rhe(torica)

verba colorat.
Mu(sica) canit.
Ar(ithmetica) numerat.
Ge(ometria) ponderat.
As(tronomia) colit astra.
An

Allegory by Alain de Lille (twelfth century) accounts for ^
the system in all its complexity: the Seven Arts are
summoned in order to furnish a carriage for Prudentia. which
seeks to guide man; Grammatica furnishes the pole, Loaica
(or Dialectica) the axle, which Rhetorics adorns with
jewels; the quadrivium furnishes the four wheels, the horses
are the five senses harnessed by Ratio: the carriage goes
toward the saints,■. Mary, God; when the limits of human power
are reached, Theoloaia takes over for Prudentia (education
is redemption.

The phantom is always on the prowl.
Outside of
France today, in certain countries where it is necessary, bi
opposition to a colonial past, to reduce French to the
status of a foreign language, one hears it affirmed that it
must be taught, that.is,,only the French language, • not the

literature: as if there were a barrier between language and
literature, as if language were here and not there, as if
one could hold back some part, beyond which there were

simply inessential supplements, whence literature.
"Suprema manus apponit. opusoue sororum

Perficit ataue semel

factum perfectius ornat."

(Rhetoric applies the finishing touches, completes the work
of her sisters and embellishes the act in a most

accomplished fashion. )

The wheel of Virgil is a figurative classification
of the three "styles"; each of the three sectors of the
wheel gathers together a homogeneous ensemble of terms and
symbols:
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' . AEMlip:

J

•

BUCOLICS:

: CEQRGICS'

grayis ;$tylus, hurailis styXiis :
mediocrus stylus
;miles dominans pastor otiosus
agricola
Hector, Ajax
Tilyrus, Meli boeus TriptolemusC
::
c':;,;,.;- -■■.. .eguiis .
■ /C :;: . ^-^vls
r ' '^ bos VI '
gladius

baculus

urbs, castrum

pascua

aratrum

ager.

laurus, cedrus fagus
;

;

p^

eParanetic:; "Of , pertaining to; or , of the' nature

Of paranesiS:; a;dyisory, hortatory. . ; .i . • A hortatoiry '
composition. Obs." Oxford English Dictionary, vol. VII,
451.

(Oxford: Clarendon, 1978) .

, . ■

In pointing out certain ancient sources of the

Middle Ages, one must recall that the unrivalied inter

textua1 foundation, if you wiit, is Aristotle, and even, in
a sense, Aristotle over against Plato. Plato was
transmitted partially by St. Augustine and in the twelfth
century fostered the school of Chartres (a "literary"
school, as opposed to the logical, Aristotelian school of

■

Paris.) and the Abbey . of St. : Victor ; yet in the thirteenth ; : \
century, the only genuine translations were those of the
Phaedrus and the Menp, which were moreover little known.

in

. the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, a bitter struggle

.

arose against Aristotle in the name of Plato (Marsilio

Ficino and Giordano Bruno) . As for Aristotle, he is
introduced into the Middle Ages on two occasions: the first
time, in the fifth and sixth centuries, partially by
Martinus Cape11a, the Categories of Prophyry, Boethius; the
second time, in full force, in the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries: in the ninth century all of Aristotle has been
translated into Arabic; in the twelfth century, one had at
one's disposal integral translations, either in Greek or in
Arabic: this is the massive intrusion of the Posterior

Analytics, tlie Topics, the Refutations, tlie Physics and the
Metaphysics; Aristotle is Christianized (St. Thomas) .
The
third introduction of Aristotle will be that of his Poetics

in the sixteenth century in Italy and in the seventeenth
century in France.
. ■ 'Vl ■
The death of Christ on the cross is itself

assimilated in the scenario of the Disputatio (today some
would find this reduction of the Passion to a school

exercise a sacrilege; others, on the contrary, would admire "
the liberty of spirit of the Middle Ages, which would never
breech any taboo against the "drama" of intellect) : Circa
tertiam vel sextam ascendunt magistri (in theoloaia)
cathedram suam ad disputandum et auerunt unam questionem.
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Cui questioni respondet unus assistentiiiin. Post cuius
responioriem maaisLer determinat quest
et auandd vult
el defferre et honorem facere. nihil aliud determinat auant
quQd dixerat respondens. Sic fecit liddie Christus in cruce .
uni ascendit ad disputandum: eL proposuit unam guestionem
Ueo Parti; Eli. Eli. lamma sabachtani. Deus. Deus meus. quid
me dereliquisti? Et Pater resonditt Ha. Fiii mi. opera^
manuum tuarum ne despicias: non enim Pater redemit genus v
hamanum sine te. Et ille respondens ait: Ha. Pat.er. bene
determinasti questionem m.eam.
Non determinabo earn post.
responsionem tuam.
Non sicut ego volo . sed sicut tii vis.

Fiat voluntas tua. (Around the third or sixth hour, the
master (in theology) takes the pulpit in order to dispute ,
and pose a question. One of the assistants then responds to
this question. Following his response, the master settles
the question, and when he wants to confer an honor on him,
he says nothing other than what the respondent has said.
This was what Christ did on the cross one day, wlien he
yielded to dispute, posing a question to God the Father:
Eli, Eli, lamma sabachtani, My God, my God why have you
forsaken me? And the Father responds: my Son, do not doubt
the work of your hands, because the Father cannot redeem

mankind without you. .And Christ responds: my Father, you
have answered my question well. I can say nothing after
your response, etc.) , [T.N. There is no such dialogue;. . ;
betv;een the Father ; and Son in any of the canonica1 Gospels,
and a thorough check of concordances of the Apocrypha turned
up nothing either. This dialogue may come from som.e Latin
tract on teaching rhetoric.]
.^
'

^' T.N. Mach^: "battle, fight, combat." George Ricker
Berry, Ph.D., comp.

The Classical Greek Dictionarv

(Chicago: Follett, 1962). ;;' i

;- .

Perelman, Chaim, and L. Obrechts-Tyteca, La , .

'Vt,

Nouvelle Rh^torique—Trait^ de 1'Argumentation. vo1.; 2
(Paris: PUF, 1958)
The Hew Rhetoric; A Treatise on
Argumentation. trahs. John WiIkinson and Purcell Weaver

(Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame UP, 1969).
T.N. Precellence: "an exceling, exceeding,
surmounting, surpassing." Randle Cotgrave, comp. , A

Dictionarie of the French and English Tongues. Reproduced
from the first edition with introduction by William S. Woods
(London: 1611; Columbia: U of South Carolina P, 1950).
T 7 '■ \ ' , • ' ■

' - ■'

-

''

■■

■■ ■■

t

(The sophistic of no among the mystics: "to belong

to everything. be careful to belong to nothing in respect to

nothing.")
"By an easily explained paradox, this
destructive logic is pleasing to conservatives: that is
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because it is inoffensive; abolishing everything it touches
nothing. Deprived of any efficacy it is fundamentally only
a rhetoric: some false states of mind, some operations done
to the language, this is not what wili cliange the course of
the wor3d." Jean-Pau1 Sartre, Saint-Genet; Comedien et
Martvr (Paris: Galimard, 1952) 191. ; Saint Genet. Actor and
Martyr. trans. Bernard Freclitman (New York: George

Brazi 1 ler, 1963)

J. Kristeva, Semiotilc^ (Paris: Seuil, 1969).

^- Groups jji . Rhetoriaue g^n^ral. 1970.

Group

General Rhetoric. trans. Paul B. Burrell and Edgar Slotlcin
(Baltimore: Johns Hoplcins UP, 1981).

20 "The disappearance of traditional Rhetoric has
created a void in the humanities, and stylistics has already

gone a long way to fill this void. In fact, it would not be
wrong to describe stylistics as a 'new rhetoric,' adapted to
the models and exingencies of modern studies in linguistics
and literature."

S. Ullmann, Language and Style, 130.

21 See notably Jacques Durand, "Rh^torique et image
publici tai re ^" Communications 15 (1970).

22 71^ example of the exemplum given by Quintilian: "The
flute players who had retreated from Rome were called bac3c
by a decree of the Senate; all the more reason to remember

the great citizens who have deserved well of the Republic
and whom the misfortunes of the times have forced into

exile": a general lihlc in the inductive chain: the class of
uti1itarian people, first driven out then called back.

22 Exemplum a contrario: "These pictures, these statues
that Marcellus returned to the enemies, Verres stole from

allies."

(Cicero).

■

,

; '

2"^ An example of the parable ta3cen from a Socratic
discourse: one must not chose magistrates by lot any more
than athletes and pilots.
,
i

25 T.N. "Epirus: In ancient geography, that part of
northern Greece which lies between I1lyria on the north,

Macedonia and Thessaly on the East, Aeto1ia, Acarnaria and
the Ambracian Gulf on the south, and the Ionian Sea on the
west." century Cyclopedia of Names. ed. Benjamin E. Smith,
A.M. (New Yorlc: The Century Co. , 1894).

25 An extended epicheireme: The who1e Pro Milone by
Cicero: 1) ]ci11ing those whom we set traps for is permitted.

130

2) proof, drawn Vfrom natural law^ . the nights of; the peopie, , ,
the exempla, 3.) Glpdius . set a trap for Milo 41'prodf. d
from facts, 5) Milo is therefore permitted to hin clodius.
The maxim (gnomd. sententia) is a formuTa which
expresses the general., but only the general which has

actions (those which are chosen or avoided), as its object;
for AristotTe, the fouhdetioh of the gnome, is always the
eikos. in accordance v/ith liis definition of the enthymeme by
the content of tlie premises: but for the academics, who
define the enthymeme by its "truncation," the maxim is
essentially an "abridgment": "it tlierefore happens sometimes
tliat one encompasses tv/o propositions in a single
proposition: the enthymematic sentence" (for example:
Mortal, do not harbor an immortal hatred):1
.

T.M. This hind of discoyefihg is quite similar to

what Michael Poidi^.Yi describes ■ .as. "taC;it khowing" in the.
first, chapter of The TaCit: Dimension .(Garden City, New York:
Doubleday & Co. , 1956).

.

An example of an apt abridgment: this line from

Medea by Ovid, "which contains a very elegant enthymeme":
Servare potui> perdere an passim roaas? I was able to save
you, therefore you could die. (That which can be saved can

die, now I can save you, therefore you could die.)
These topical grids are stupid; they liave nothing
whatsoever to do with "life," "truth," and there has been

■

good reason to banish them from modern teaching, etc.
Without doubt: sti11 the "subjects" (of obligation, of
dissertation) must follow this great movement. At the
moment I write this, I mean that one of tlie "siibjects" for : ;
the final diploma is something like tliis: Must one respect . :
one's elders? A stupid subject, an indispensible topic.
i
.
The excusatlo propter infirmitatem still.reigns
abundantly in our writing. Witness this joking excusatio of
Michel Cournot (Nouvelle observateur. 4 March, 1965): "I am
not laughing this week, the Gospel is my subject, and v;hy
hot^ say it at once, I'm not up to it, etc."
Two examples of advnaton: : .

Belli le:

Soon the black crow unites with the swallov;;
< ,Soon the unfaithful dove will go without dread ■ " .
To her love, far from the marriage bed
And witliout fear will give her . heart and fidelity
To the savage sparrow hawk, his heart and honor.

131

Theophile de Viau:

This brook flows backwards in its
course,

An ox climbs the belltower,
Blood runs from this rock,
An asp mates with a she-bear.
At the top of this old tower
A serpent tears open a vulture;

Fire burns inside the ice,
The sun has become black,

I see the moon falling.
This tree has left its place.

T.N. Elsewhere Barthes translates this as "It may
be," which seems to work well here also.

T.N. "Aedes, n. m.

singer in ancient Greece.
vol. 1, 58.

(Gr. aiodos. singer).

Orpheus was an aede."

A poet-

Robert

There is no listing for this item in the Oxford

English Dictionary.
85

•

.

T.N. Tm English example might be: "Borne on the bier

with white and bristly beard."

In any case, the English

tradition here is quite unlike the French.
or

T.N. The numbers in the original text are incorrect.
I have corrected them here.
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APPENDIX

RHETORIC:

I

CHRONOLOGY

Before Christ

5th century
(480-460)

-Sicily: rhetoric taught.
-Corax: first division of the Oratio.
-Gorqias at Athens: Prose rhetorified.

-Hippias of Elis.: everyday culture
opposed to Philosophy: distant.origin
of the Liberal Arts of the Middle

Ages.

4th century
(395-375)
(329-323)

-Plato: dialogues concerning Rhetoric.
-The Rhetoric of Aristotle.
-Zeno of Citium. Greek Stoicism and

philosophical grammar.
3rd-2nd century
-The Alexanderians: Quarrel between the

Analogists and the Anomolists. (The
Analogists postulate that grammar is
rule-governed and that this regularity
reflects the regularity of the world
and the spirit. The Ai^iomolists
searched for irregularities,
exceptions.)
1st century
(116-27)

-Varro: a) mediation in the quarrel
between the Analogists and the
Anomolists.

(107-43)
(ca. 85)
(65-8)
(43 B.C.-A.D. 16)

b) Revival of the liberal

disciplines.
-Cicero: practice of Aristotelian
rhetoric.
-Rhetorica ad Herennium.

-Horace: The Art of Poetry.
-Ovid: fusion of Rhetoric and Poetry.
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After Christ

1st century

(40-118)

-Ouintilian: pedagogy of Aristotelian

(45-125)
(55-120)

rhetoric.
-Plutarch: moralization of rhetoric.
-Tacitus: unification of all the arts
of discourse under the name of
eloquentia.

-Peri Hvpsos: treatise On the Sublime.

2nd century

-The Second Sophistic or Neo-Rhetoric,
Asianism against Atticism.
3rd century
-Prophvrv; Eisagoge (Categories);

introduction to Aristotle's logic.
4th century
(310-393)
(ca. 350)
(354-430)

-Ausonius: transmits Neo-Rhetoric to

the Middle Ages.
-Donatus. grammarian.
-St. Augustine: Christian Rhetoric.

5th century
-Sidonius Apollinaris: transmits Neo(ca. 420)

Rhetoric to the Middle Ages.
-Martianus Cape11a: the establishing of
the Seven Liberal Arts.

(end of 5th c. ,

beginning of
6th c. )

-Priscian. grammarian.

6th century
(480-524)

-Boethius; the first entry of

(490-575)

-Cassiodorus: Christianization of the

Aristotle: logic limited.
Liberal Arts and notably the figures
of Rhetoric.

134

7th century
(570-636)

-Isadore of Seville:
(Etvmoloav):
confinnation of the Trivium.

8th century

Bede: Rhetoric applied systematical3y

(673-735)7

to the Bible.

9th century

-Carolingian reform of the schools:
Alculn.

-Aristotle translated into Arabic.

11th century
-Scot Eriaene and Real isin.
-Roscelin and Nominalism.

12th century

-Second entry of Aristotle: the
complete Logic.
-Conflict betveen,.Chartres. and, Paris
betv/een Rhetorica and Dialectica. .

between;Literature and Phildsophvy
between the Studium dnd .the

Sacerdotium. ,Victory of Paris and
Dialectica.

(1096-11,41)

-New classifications of the Trivium
under the dominance of Di alectica:

(1128-1202)

-Alaih de Li11e; Allegory of the

(ca. 1150)

-Peter Helias: beginning of speculative

Hugh■of

St.

Victor. ■

Chariot. ' . ■ ■.v

; ,9 ,

V:;,;

,9.";^ ;

grammar.

93th century

(1200);

:

-Founding of the University of Paris.
-The Modistae.

14th century

-Ars obligatoria, code of the
Disputatio. ,
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15th century

-Arts of the Second Rhetoric = poetic

arts (from the point of view of verbal
forms and not of composition).
16th century

-Entry of Aristotld's Poetics into
Italy: Castelvetro, Scaliger, Veda.
(1521)
(1555)
(1555)

(1592)

-Fabri's Comprehensive Rhetoric.

-Ramus' (anti-Aristotelian) Dialectic
-Foclin's Rhetoric.
-Nunez's rhetoric in Latin.
-Rhetoric becomes the foundation of
Jesuit education.

17th century
(ca. 1630)

-Entry of Aristotle's Poetics into

(1675)

-Bernard Lamv: the Rhetoric or the Art

France.

of Speaking.
18th century
(1730)

-DuMarsais:

(1783)

-Rhetoric of Hugh Blair.

Treatise of the Tropes.

19th century
(1807)

-GaiHard: the Rhetoric for Young
Ladies.,
-Fontanier: Classic manual for the

study of the Tropes.
(end of the

19th century)

-Gradual extinction of treatises on
Rhetoric.
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APPENDIX II

TO

RHETORIC TREE

TEGHNE RHETORIKE

disp6sitio

INVENTIO

I
TO MOVE

TO gonvinge:
■

^''I ■

\ ■

atechno1 entechnoi

■ .■

ELOGUTIO

I : ■

Composltlo

Elec tio

Animps

Hem

im pellere

Docere

I

Dlsposi- Eniotions

r

Tropes

:

1

Figu res

(Character)
exempliim

enthynieme
1
semeion

I

tekimerion

exprdlum

eikos

epilogue

Captatio
-J

Confirmatio

^ Partitio
Facts

benevolentiae

TOPIC

OJ

Narratio

Desc ription

Piace
r

Common

Special
quaestio
Thesis

Hypothesis

Propositic

Causa

I

epideictic

1

Judicial

'

deliberative

StatLs
Causae

Disceptatio

A rgumen tati6

Altercatio

INDEX

Adynaton: B.1.21.
'4.11iteration: B.3.6.
Altercatio: B.2.10.

Anacoluthon: B.3.5. ,6.
Antithesis: B.3.5.

Apophony: B.3.6.

Aposiopesis: B.3.6.
Ar^t6: B.1.28.

Ellipsis: B.3.16.
Elocutio: B.3.
Enumeratio: B.2.6.

Entechnoi (pisteis): B.1.6
Enthymeme: B.1.6. , 10.
Epichiereme: B.l.ll.
Epideictic: A;2.1.
Epidiegesis: B.2.9.

Argumentatio: B.3.10.

Epilogue: B.2.3. 6.

Articulus: B.2.11.

Esto: B.l 15. ,29

Atechnoi (pisteis):
B.1.4.,5.

Eth^: B.l 28.
Eunoia: B.1.28.

Author: A.6.2.

Exemplum:

Auxesis: B.3.6.

Exordium: B.2.3. ,5.

B.1.6.

7.

Expositio: A.6.1

Captatio benevolentiae:
B.2.5.

Fable: B.1.7.

Catachresis: B.3.5.,6

Figures: B.3.5.

Causa: B.1.25.

Figures of Subject: B.2.11.

Chreia (Chrie): B.1.20.
,Coion: B.3.11.
Commentator: A.6.2.

Genres: B.1.25.
Grammaticus: A.4.6.

Commonplaces: B.1.21. ,23.
Compilator: A.6.2.
Compositio: B.2.,B.3.2. ,11

Honestum: B.2.5.

Conclusio: B.2.6.
Confirmatio: B.2.10.

Hypallage: B.3.5.
Hyperbole: B.3.6.

Conjecture: B.1.26.
Conlocatio: B.2.

Hypothesis: A.6.12. ,B.1.25.

Humile: B.2.5,

Hypotyposis: B.3.10.

Controversiae: A.4.4.
Color: B.3.3
Cumulus: B.2.6

Imago: B.1.8.

Declamatio: A.4.6. ,A.5.2.

Inventio: B.l. , B.1.1.

Imperator: A.7.3.
Insinuatio: B.2.5.

Definition: B.1.26.

Descriptio: A.5.2, B.2.9.

Jusjurandum: B.l.4.

Dictamen: A.6.6.
Dictator: A.6.6.

Lectio: A.4.6.
Lesson: A.6.1.
Maxim: B.l.ll.

Disceptatio: B.1.26.

Dispositio: B.2.

Metaphor: B.3.5.
Metonymy: B.3.5.

Disputatio: A.6.1, 10.
Dubium: B.2.5.

Narratio (exercise): A.4.6
Narratio (part of

Egressio: B.2.1.
'Eikos: B.1.13.,15.

discourse): B.2.7.

Ekpharsis: A.5.2.
Electio: B.3.2. , 3.
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